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In recent years, the military has increasingly relied on the use of Special and 
Incentive (S&I) pays to recruit and retain personnel in specialized career paths (Under 
Secretary of Defense, Personnel & Readiness, 2012). The more than 60 S&I pays used by 
the Department of Defense are critical to ensure the military maintains the necessary 
quantities of qualified personnel to support the manning requirements of vital positions 
(Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R), 2011). A key 
example of these S&I pays is Aviation Officer Continuation Pay (AOCP), known in the 
Navy as Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP). It is commonly referred to as the 
“Aviation Department Head Bonus.” For more than 30 years, Navy Force managers have 
sought, through the use of retention bonuses, to maintain a balanced supply of 
experienced Naval Aviators to support the mission requirements of naval aviation (USD 
(P&R), 2011). 
The success of this program, however, has varied not just over time, but within 
the different naval aviation communities, wherein bonus amounts at times have proven 
insufficient to meet retention goals in certain communities while resulting in over-
retention in others (Aviation Career Continuation Pay Program Manager (ACCP PM), 
personnal communication, March 19, 2014).1 At the same time, the current fiscal 
environment has resulted in increased scrutiny of military expenditures, specifically 
personnel costs, which consume an increasingly larger portion of the Department of 
Defense’s budget. To that end, President Obama has directed a review of military 
compensation in an effort to develop a flexible, efficient, and effective system capable of 
maintaining an appropriately sized, high-quality Force at a fiscally sustainable cost (H. R. 
Doc No. 113-60, 2013). 
                                                 
1 This information was communicated via MS Excel spreadsheets containing ACCP performance from  
2005 through 2013. 
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B. RESEARCH SUMMARY  
Via the use of auction mechanisms, we explore how aviator retention bonuses 
might be improved, in terms of cost, quantity, and quality of personnel retained. 
Specifically, through the implementation of a survey of active duty Naval Aviators, we 
estimate individual servicemembers’ willingness to stay in active duty naval aviation 
beyond their initial service obligation. Additionally, by using performance metrics 
identified by Naval Personnel Command (NPC), we establish quality scores for 
individual aviators based on his or her survey responses. This data is used to compare 
recent ACCP results against three distinct auction models: 1) a uniform-price auction 
mechanism, 2) a Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD) auction mechanism, and 3) 
Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM).  
In modeling the effects of a uniform-price auction, we find that naval aviation can 
precisely meet the specific retention objectives of every community. While this results in 
increased spending to retain the desired number of aviators in communities that have 
historically under-retained, these costs are partially offset by the savings realized in 
eliminating the over-retention experienced in other communities. Achieving the exact 
retention requirements for the communities modeled results in an aggregate increase of 
13.5% or $2,950,000 over the current ACCP program. In correcting for over-retention, 
however, we find that the amount spent per aviator retained in support of naval aviation 
requirements actually decreases by 2.6%. Moreover, using two methodologies to measure 
aviator quality we find no significant correlation between an officer’s quality and the cost 
to retain the officer beyond the initial service obligation.  
In modeling two different QUAD auction mechanisms, we find that naval aviation 
planners can realize improvements in both cost and the overall quality of retained 
aviators. To improve the retention rates of high-quality aviators, the first model employs 
a discount of $25,000 to the top 10% from each community. We find that in comparison 
to the uniform-price model, this mechanism also meets all retention goals while 
increasing the average quality of retained aviators by 3.2% and reducing Aggregate 
Retention costs by 3.4%. A second QUAD simulation—applying a $50,000 discount to 
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the top 50% from each category—results in an average quality improvement of 15.5% 
above the uniform-price model at an increased cost of 3.6% in Aggregate Retention. 
In modeling a CRAM, we use two non-monetary incentives (NMIs) to improve 
retention costs. The first model offers guaranteed duty station as an NMI. In comparison 
to the uniform-price model, leveraging the utility aviators receive from this NMI in 
excess of the Navy’s cost to provide it results in a savings of more than $4,800,000 in 
Aggregate Retention costs. Moreover, this model demonstrates the potential to meet all 
retention objectives while saving more than $1,400,000 over the current method. The 
second CRAM model employs the guarantee of an in-residence graduate program as an 
NMI. In comparison to the uniform-price model, leveraging the utility aviators receive 
from this NMI in excess of the Navy’s cost to provide it, results in a savings of more than 
$2,800,000 in Aggregate Retention costs. This second CRAM model also meets all 
retention objectives and saves 1.8% in comparison to the current ACCP program. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This study is organized into six chapters. Chapter II provides background 
information on naval aviation career progression, as well as performance evaluation and 
advancement procedures. Additionally, Chapter II details the origins and current 
implementation of naval aviation retention bonuses. Chapter III discusses the 
fundamental principles of auction theory and the application to the issue of Naval Aviator 
retention. Chapter IV explains the specific auction mechanisms used in our research. 
Chapter V describes the retention survey used to solicit data from Naval Aviators and the 
metrics used to develop quality scores. In Chapter V, we also detail the sample statistics 
and the relationship between quality score and reservation price. In Chapter VI, we 
provide the methodology and results for the auction mechanisms used in our research. 
Chapter VII summarizes the findings of the previous chapter and we provide 
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II. BACKGROUND 
In this chapter, we discuss the aspects relevant to understanding the nature and 
intent of the aviator retention bonus program. Section A details the typical aviation 
officer’s career path, as well as the skills and experience expected to be developed as the 
individual advances in the profession. To better understand how these factors are used to 
determine what makes a “high-quality” aviator, we also explain the process by which 
Naval Aviators are selected for both promotion and assignment to key positions in the 
aviation community. 
In section B of this chapter, we summarize the history and evolution of aviator 
retention bonuses. Additionally, the current system is explained in detail, highlighting 
several aspects that might be improved using a market-based mechanism. These key 
parameters include the costs incurred by retaining aviators above Navy requirements 
(Table 7) and the costs associated with retaining aviators who fail to serve in the capacity 
for which they were retained (Table 10). 
A. NAVAL AVIATOR CAREER PROGRESSION AND EVALUATION 
Substantial time and resources are required to develop, standardize, and maintain 
the skills needed in naval aviation. To more efficiently use these resources and ensure the 
maximum return on the Navy’s investment, the naval aviation community has instituted a 
relatively rigid career path for aviation officers. The first 12 years can be categorized into 
five stages: flight training, first sea tour, first shore tour, second sea tour, and department 
head tour. 
From the onset of their aviation careers, Naval Aviators are continuously 
evaluated and ranked against their peers. Those deemed to be top performers are eligible 
for career milestone opportunities. Attainment of those milestones is often a de facto if 
not a de jure requirement for continued advancement in the aviation community. (See 
Appendix A for a diagram depicting the typical aviation career path and milestones.) 
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1. Career Progression and Milestones 
This section details the typical career progression for Naval Aviators along with 
the milestones they are expected to complete as they advance in their careers. 
a. Flight Training 
All Naval Aviators undergo some form of flight training. While it varies in 
duration and in the specifics taught, flight training can be divided into two general 
categories: Under graduate flight training and the training completed at Fleet 
Replacement Squadrons. 
(1) Undergraduate Flight Training. All flight training received prior to official 
designation as a naval pilot or NFO is categorized as undergraduate flight training. This 
initial training for prospective pilots and NFOs, termed Student Naval Aviators (SNAs) 
and Student Naval Flight Officers (SNFOs), respectively, falls under the cognizance of 
the Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA), who oversees the five wings and 17 
squadrons that make up Naval Air Training Command (TRACOM). Each year, more than 
1,500 pilots and NFOs from the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and various foreign 
nations complete CNATRA’s flight training curriculum (CNATRA, n.d.b). 
Flight training for all prospective aviators begins with Introductory Flight 
Screening (IFS). Designed to reduce attrition rates at more advanced stages of training, 
IFS attempts to identify prospective Naval Aviators who lack the required 
“determination, motivation, or aeronautical adaptability” while improving the 
performance of officers without previous aeronautical experience (CNATRA, p. 4). Once 
enrolled in IFS, student aviators are given 50 days in which they must first pass the FAA 
Private Pilot Airplane Airman Test with a minimum score of 80. They then receive up to 
15 hours of flight training in which to qualify for and complete a solo flight. Failing to 
meet either of these requirements will result in the prospective aviator being considered 
for elimination from naval aviation training. Officers who already possess at least a 
recreational pilot certificate are exempted from the IFS program (CNATRA, 2012, March 
19). 
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Following IFS, all prospective aviators report to NAS Pensacola for Aviation 
Preflight Indoctrination (API). Another screening tool, API is a six-week course of 
instruction that evaluates prospective aviators on fundamental aviation concepts such as 
aerodynamics, weather, and navigation. Student aviators unable to maintain the minimum 
academic requirements are considered for redesignation or administrative separation 
(Naval Aviation Schools Command, 2013).  
After successfully completing API, SNAs and SNFOs are separated into distinct 
training pipelines (i.e., curriculums). These both begin with “primary” flight training 
(approximately 22 weeks in length for SNAs and half of that for SNFOs). Here, student 
aviators are instructed in basic flight maneuvers, precision aerobatics, instrument 
navigation, and formation flight. Upon completing primary, the graduating cohorts are 
ranked according to their undergraduate flight training performances to date. Then, in 
accordance with their ranking, they are allowed to “select” individual follow-on pipeline 
from the quotas available at the time. The type and quantity of quotas are established by 
projected requirements for the naval aviation community. Some of these pipelines are 
particular to a single aviation community (e.g., VQ(T) pilot and VP NFO pipelines); 
others have additional “selection” points where students again compete for quotas leading 
to a specific aviation community (e.g., the SNA and SNFO Strike pipelines; these later 
split into VFA and VAQ specific curriculums). (See Appendix B for a diagram depicting 
flight training progression.) 
Once a SNA or SNFO selects a specific community, there is a general 
commitment to serve in that community for the remainder of one’s Active Duty aviation 
career.2 Table 1 lists the communities and associated Type, Model, and Series (T/M/S) 
aircraft from which SNAs and SNFOs may select. Depending on the community, SNAs 
typically complete undergraduate flight training in 18 to 24 months after receiving 
commission. SNFOs have shorter training pipelines and complete roughly 12 to 18 
months after commissioning. It is upon successfully completing this undergraduate flight 
                                                 
2 Inter-community transfers are handled internal to PERS-43. As a general policy, PERS-43 does not 
accept transfers from aviators beyond the First Sea Tour. In FY-2014, only two of the seven transfer 
requests received were approved. 
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training that SNAs and SNFOs are “winged”—that is, officially designated as Naval 
Aviators or Naval Flight Officers. 
 
 
Table 1.   Active Duty Naval Aviation Communities and Aircraft 
 (after U.S. Navy, n.d.) 
(2) Fleet Replacement Squadron. Despite having earned their wings, newly 
designated aviators must still undergo training before reporting to an operational 
squadron. This training is completed at community-specific Fleet Replacement 
Squadrons (FRSs). Here, aviators learn to employ the T/M/S aircraft they will fly in the 
fleet. Notable exceptions to this are SNFOs in the VAW, VP, VQ(P), and VQ(T) 
communities. While these aviators are still considered to be in the undergraduate phase of 
training, they are transferred out of the TRACOM pipeline and are winged while at their 
respective FRS. Here again, time to progress through the FRS varies by community, with 
some aviators completing in as little as six months and others taking over a year. (See 
Appendix B for a diagram depicting flight training progression.) 
b. Initial Active Duty Service Obligation 
Upon receiving their “wings,” pilots and NFOs incur the Minimum Service 
Requirement (MSR) associated with completing flight training. This period of obligated 
service is mandated under Title 10 U.S.C. § 653 (2014), which states, “The minimum 
Community Formal Name T/M/S Aircraft
HM Helicopter Mine Countermeasures MH-53E
VAQ Electronic Attack EA-6B/EA-18G
VAW Carrier Airborne Early Warning E-2C,D
VFA Strike Fighter FA-18C,E,F
VP Patrol P-3C/P-8A
VRC Fleet Logistics Support C-2
VQ(P) Fleet Air Reconnaissance EP-3E
VQ(T) Fleet Air Reconnaissance E-6B
HS/HSC
Helicopter Anti-Submarine/       




SH-60B/           
MH-60R
Helicopter Anti-Submarine Light/ 
Helicopter Maritime Strike 
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service requirement for all pilots trained to fly fixed-wing jet aircraft shall be eight years 
... The minimum service requirement for all other pilots and NFOs shall be six years.” In 
2003, the Navy increased the MSR for all pilots to eight years (ACCP PM, personal 
communication, 2014, January 13).3 
Aviators begin serving this commitment from the day they are winged. Based on 
the timing associated with the current aviation career path, NFOs typically complete their 
MSR at the end of their First Shore Tour. Because of the additional two-year 
commitment pilots incur, they are normally obligated to complete a Second Sea Tour 
before being eligible to separate from the naval service. 
c. First Sea Tour 
Upon successfully completing the FRS, all Naval Aviators report to a fleet 
squadron. Depending on a number of factors including community, designation, and 
training delays, aviators arrive at their first shore tour roughly 18 to 36 months after 
beginning flight training. Typically 36 months in length, this tour is primarily for young 
aviators to accumulate experience and attain the tactical qualifications commensurate 
with their positions (NPC, n.d.b). As this is considered a first Division Officer (DIVO) 
tour, junior aviators are assigned increasingly significant squadron ground jobs (i.e., 
primary and collateral duties) as they progress. In addition to their performance in the 
aircraft, junior aviators are assessed on their ability to effectively manage these ground 
jobs. 
d. First Shore Tour 
After completing the First Sea Tour, the aviator normally receives 33-month 
orders to a First Shore Tour. Unlike their previous assignments, several career options are 
available to aviators. “The Naval Aviation Community, however, prioritizes production 
billets. These billets are defined as any flying job which contributes to the support and 
manning of the Naval Aviation Community. Priority is given to filling these billets first” 
(Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP), 2013 May 13, para. 4). Given the desirability of these 
                                                 
3 This information was communicated via an internal report on the FY 2013 ACCP program. 
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limited, production billets to naval aviation and individual aviators, candidates requesting 
such assignments are screened to ensure the best-qualified aviators are selected. 
Production billets include instructor duty at an FRS or TACRON squadron; duty at a Test 
and Evaluation squadron; and Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) positions. 
Fundamental to these positions is the potential for aviators to 1) contribute to the naval 
aviation community, 2) further their own experience and skills, and 3) compete against a 
large peer group (NPC, n.d.b). 
Other career options include non-production flying billets, such as Pilot Exchange 
Program (PEP) tours, or duty at a Search and Rescue Unit. Among non-flying billets, 
aviators may elect to pursue advanced degrees via the Naval Postgraduate School or 
some other scholarly program. They may also be nominated to fill various staff positions. 
Additionally, aviators may serve as company officers at the U.S. Naval Academy or 
NROTC units (NPC, n.d.b). Because these positions lack at least one of the key facets of 
production billets, they “can have adverse long-term career implications in future 
selection boards” (CNP, 2013 May 13, para. 6). 
e. Second Sea Tour 
Following a First Shore Tour, aviators are generally assigned 24-month orders to 
a “Second Sea Tour,” also termed a “Disassociated Sea Tour.” Here again, the range of 
assignments is quite broad, and previous performance plays a large part in determining 
what options are available to a particular aviator. Aviators are expected to broaden their 
experience base and earn whatever additional qualifications are available to them (e.g., 
Officer of the Deck or Tactical Action Officer qualifications). Unlike previous tours, 
however, and because certain skills may not have been retained or acquired during a 
previous assignment (specifically, Weapons and Tactics Instructor qualifications), some 
options may not be available to those who have otherwise demonstrated exceptional 
performance in their previous assignment (NPC, 2013 July). 
As before, those positions that enable aviators to add to their professional 
development, compete in large summary groups, and contribute back to the naval 
aviation Community are perceived as the most valued (NPC, n.d.b). Some of the more 
valued positions include flying duty as a community representative on a Carrier Air Wing 
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staff or as a squadron Training Officer. Other viable career-advancing opportunities 
include non-flying staff assignments, as well as aviation-related positions aboard an 
aircraft carrier or a large-deck amphibious ship. Also available are additional flying 
opportunities such as a “Super JO”4 tour with either an active duty or reserve squadron, 
or a PEP tour. 
f. Department Head Tour 
All aviators selected for Operational DH will be assigned 30-month orders back to 
a fleet squadron following their Second Sea Tour. Those not current in the employment 
of their community’s aircraft will first proceed to the FRS to complete a modified 
training syllabus before reporting to their DH Tour. 
Unlike the First Sea Tour, where aviators are ranked primarily by the 
qualifications earned and demonstrated proficiency in the aircraft, every DH is expected 
to be fully qualified and skilled in the judicious employment of his or her aviation 
platform. The success, then, of an aviator’s DH tour is measured in large part by the 
individual’s performance of assigned ground jobs. Specifically, these positions are 
Squadron Maintenance Officer and Operations Officer. These positions are deemed 
considerably more vital to both the day-to-day and long-term success of the squadron 
than any position that might have been held during the First Sea Tour. The duration and 
performance as either Maintenance Officer or Operations Officer is a primary 
discriminator in an aviator’s selection for command and subsequent advancement (CNP, 
2013 May). 
2. Performance Evaluation and Advancement 
a. Performance Evaluation 
Navy Fitness Reports (FITREPS) are recognized as the best method for 
documenting and rewarding an aviator’s performance (NPC, 2013, May). Using periodic 
FITREPS, a reporting senior (typically the Commanding Officer) evaluates and ranks the 
                                                 
4 This is a junior officer who returns to an aviation squadron to serve in the same capacity as an aviator 
in the First Sea Tour. 
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aviators within each “summary group” (i.e., all the Unrestricted Line (URL) officers of 
the same pay grade under the cognizance of that reporting senior) according to the 
metrics relevant to that particular group. These officers are ranked numerically and 
divided into promotion recommendation categories. Sixty percent of Lieutenant (O-3) 
summary groups may receive recommendations of Early Promote (EP) or Must Promote 
(MP), with the higher-ranking EP being reserved for no more than the top 20%. For 
Lieutenant Commander (O-4) summary groups, 20% may still receive EP 
recommendations, but the EP/MP recommendations cannot exceed 50% of the group. 
The remaining officers in these pay grades generally receive recommendations of 
“Promotable” (some significant issue notwithstanding) (CNP, 2011). 
Nearing the end of their tour, aviators will receive a “high-water” FITREP—that 
is, the final FITREP an aviator will receive during that tour in which the individual will 
be competitively ranked against one’s peers. The results of this FITREP, in effect, 
summarize the officer’s performance throughout his or her tour and standing relative to 
peers. In large part, this FITREP determines what options will be available to an aviator 
when selecting the next set of orders, with the highest-ranked aviators generally receiving 
the greatest consideration for billets deemed desirable by the naval aviation community 
(NPC, 2013, May). 
b. Statutory Boards (O-4 and O-5)
Officers are typically selected for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant (Junior 
Grade) (O-2) and Lieutenant (O-3) via an All Fully Qualified List (AFQL). This process 
screens all officers who will have completed the statutory 24 months in their current pay 
grade during the next fiscal year. All officers from this list who have received a FITREP 
advancement recommendation of at least “Promotable” will be selected for promotion. 
Barring objection from their commanding officer, these officers will automatically 
advance to the next pay grade upon satisfying the 24-month time-in-grade requirement 
(NPC, n.d.a). 
Promotions to the ranks of Lieutenant Commander (O-4) and Commander (O-5) 
are accomplished via a statutory promotion board. These boards convene annually and 
consider officers within the SECNAV-directed promotion zone for that year. These zones 
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generally align with an officer’s eighth and fourteenth years of commissioned service. 
Officers failing to select for the next pay grade are again considered for promotion the 
following year. Officers twice failing to select for Lieutenant Commander are subject to 
involuntary separation from the Active Duty naval service in accordance with Title 10 
U.S.C. § 653. Officers twice failing to select for promotion to Commander are generally 
selected for continuation if they are within six years of being eligible for retirement. They 
will, however, no longer be considered for promotion (Secretary of the Navy, 2006). 
During statutory promotion boards, aviators compete alongside the other URL 
communities (i.e., Surface Warfare, Submarine Warfare, Naval Special Warfare, and 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal) for promotion recommendations. The rate at which 
eligible officers may be selected for promotion is determined by the Active Duty Naval 
Officer Promotion Plan. Selection for Promotion rates for URL officers has been limited 
to 70% of eligible officers for both Lieutenant Commander (O-4) and Commander (O-5) 
during recent boards (Secretary of the Navy, 2013; Secretary of the Navy, 2014). 
In addition to limits on selection rates, the promotion board is given considerable 
guidance on what to consider when determining what constitutes the “best and fully 
qualified” officers to recommend for promotion. As the SECNAV guidance explains, 
“the definitive measure for fitness to promotion is the proven and sustained superior 
performance in command or other leadership positions in difficult and challenging 
assignments” (Secretary of the Navy, 2014, para. 4). Because these boards are comprised 
of officers from various URL communities with limited knowledge regarding other 
communities, NPC provides additional guidance as to the desired career paths and values 
for the various communities. (See Appendix A for NPC guidance to boards on typical 
aviator career progression and Aviation Community values.) 
Favorable consideration is also given to officers with skill sets and expertise 
mandated by current needs, but outside of an officer's operational profession. These 
include skills such as Financial Resource Management, Operational Analysis, and Joint 
Experience. Additional consideration is also given to officers who have attained relevant 
graduate education. This also applies to officers who have displayed superior 
performance in assignments that may have taken them out of their communities’ normal 
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career progression, such as Individual Augmentee (IA) assignments (Secretary of the 
Navy, 2014). 
c. Administrative Selection Boards (Department Head and Aviation 
Command) 
Conducted separately from statutory boards, administrative selection boards, or 
screen boards, are community-specific and are convened to select officers for positions in 
specific career milestones. For the aviation community, these are DH, Aviation 
Command, and Aviation Major Command. 
Officers are only considered for the DH Screen Board (DHSB) one year after 
being selected for promotion to O-4 and are classified as In-Zone (IZ) for selection. This 
is considered their “first look.” Officers not selected will receive a “second look” the 
following year and are categorized as Above-Zone (AZ). AZ officers failing to select on 
their “second look” will automatically be considered for an Operational-Training DH 
position. This provides them with a final opportunity to continue in an aviation career 
path while maximizing the return on naval aviation’s investment in their training (Naval 
Personnel Comand, 2013). 
The Aviation Command Screen Board (ACSB) follows the same basic format as 
the DHSB. Those eligible will be given two “looks” for selection to Aviation Command; 
those failing twice will be considered for selection to an Operational-Training Command. 
Unlike the DHSB, however, consideration for the ACSB is not dependent on an officer 
already having been selected for promotion. Instead, the same aviators under 
consideration for promotion to O-5 are considered for Aviation Command before the O-5 
promotion results are released (NPC, 2014). 
NPC provides additional guidance for selecting aviators via the administrative 
selection board precept memorandum. This additional guidance is nearly identical to the 
instructions SECNAV provides to statutory boards (NPC, 2012). In addition, the DHSB 
is provided the following additional guidance in the convening order for the board: 
Naval aviation is first and foremost an aerial combat force, and values the 
attainment of warfare qualifications and leadership both in the air and on 
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the ground … As aviation officers progress in their career, these 
qualifications should be documented in their official record. 
The ultimate measure of success within the aviation community is 
sustained performance in operational environments. Operational career 
milestones give every aviation officer the opportunity to develop a pattern 
of sustained superior performance within an officer’s warfare specialty. 
We continue to highly value the war fighting excellence required for our 
Operational Department Heads to excel in combat. (Naval Personnel 
Comand, 2013, para. 4) 
Table 2 depicts the selection rates for the FY-2013 ADHSB. In alignment with the 
selection board precepts, those aviators receiving EPs during the First Sea Tour selected 
at a rate 22.2% above their peers who only received an MP. Additionally, those aviators 
who received a WTI qualification demonstrated the highest selection rate at 18% above 










TOTAL 447 320 71.6% 
        
FIRST SEA TOUR   
EP 405 298 73.6% 
MP 37 19 51.4% 
        
FIRST SHORE TOUR   
FRS 166 134 80.7% 
TRACON 95 60 63.2% 
OTHER 186 126 67.7% 
        
OTHER FACTORS   
WTI 106 95 89.6% 
GSA / IA 61 40 65.6% 
OVERSEAS 120 83 69.2% 
FLAG AIDE 23 17 73.9% 
Aircraft / Warfare 
Transition 30 18 60.0% 
AMPHIB/CVN/ 
CSG TOUR 147 95 64.6% 
1 Competitive EP 91 51 56.0% 
2 Competitive EP 194 128 66.0% 
3 Competitive EP 159 141 88.7% 
0 Competitive EP 3 0 0.0% 
 
Table 2.   FY-2013 ADHSB Selection Rates (after NPC, 2013, May) 
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The guidance the ACSB uses for selecting the “best and fully-qualified” officers 
is similar to that provided to the ADHSB: 
Naval aviation is first and foremost an aerial combat force, and values the 
attainment of warfare qualifications and leadership both in the air and on 
the ground. The Naval Aviation Enterprise continues to value the war 
fighting ability and tactical excellence required for Operational 
Commanders to excel in combat. Therefore, as an aviation officer 
progresses in his/her career, achievement of community-specific warfare 
qualifications should be documented in the officer’s official record. The 
ultimate measure of success within the aviation community is sustained 
performance in operational environments. ( NPC, 2014, para 4.) 
Table 3 illustrates the selection rates for the FY-2013 ACSB. We found that 
operational performance during an aviator’s DH tour was a key discriminator, i.e., every 
officer who did not receive a number-one EP during his or her DH tour failed to select for 
command. Among aviators with a number-one EP, those who had served at the Naval 
Strike And Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) had selection rates above any other identified 
group. We discovered that other factors that appeared to have increased selection rates 





Table 3.   FY-2013 ACSB Selection Rates (after CNP, 2013 May) 
B. NAVAL AVIATION RETENTION BONUSES 
1. Origin and Evolution 
The concept of providing additional compensation to officers involved in flying 
duties traces back to the earliest days of naval aviation. The passage of the Navy 
Appropriation Act of 1914 authorized the Navy to provide a 35% pay increase to not 
more than 30 officers below the rank of Commander (O-5). They were assigned to 
aviation duty as “actual flyers of heavier-than-air craft.” While this original “flight pay” 








TOTAL 522 135 30.2%
 DH TOUR
#1 EP 300 135 45.0%
Other 222 0 0.0%
FIRST SHORE 
TOUR
FRS 139 67 48.2%
TRACOM 60 16 26.7%
NSAWC 14 10 71.4%
VX/NAVAIR 36 16 44.4%
PEP 3 1 33.3%
Other 48 25 52.1%
OTHER FACTORS
JPME 243 119 49.0%
CDO/OOD/TAO 187 102 54.5%
OVERSEAS 100 36 36.0%
FLAG AIDE 49 27 55.1%
MAJOR STAFF 188 100 53.2%
JOINT 128 68 53.1%
GSA/IA 62 13 21.0%
MASTERS 199 98 49.2%
TPS 13 8 61.5%
OVERSEAS 100 36 36.0%
 RESULTS FOR AVIATORS WITH A #1 EP DURING DH TOUR
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called Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP), has been continuously available to Naval 
Aviators for nearly 100 years (USD (P&R), 2011). 
Retention bonuses specifically targeted at aviators, however, are a relatively 
recent form of compensation. The origins of retention bonuses for Naval Aviators can be 
traced back to the early 1980s. Having endured aviator retention shortfalls in the 1970s, 
the U.S. Navy lobbied for an incentive program to provide monetary bonuses to aviators 
who agreed to remain in active duty service beyond their Minimum Service 
Requirements (MSRs). Since these retention bonus programs have been implemented, 
they have undergone significant modifications in response to fluctuating aviator retention 
rates and changes in fiscal policy (USD(P&R), 2011). 
a. Aviation Officer Continuation Pay (FY-1981 through FY-1989) 
The authority to offer retention bonuses to Naval Aviators was first granted by the 
Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1981. Under this law, the Secretary of 
Defense was authorized to pay up to four month’s salary for each year a qualified officer 
elected to remain in service beyond the initial service obligation, provided said officer: 
 was eligible to receive ACIP; 
 was below O-7 in pay grade; 
 was qualified to perform “operational flying duty;” 
 had completed at least six but less than 18 years of aviation service as an 
officer; 
 was in an aviation specialty designated as “critical;” 
 was under a written agreement to remain in active service for at least one 
year; and 
 was not to surpass 19 years of aviation service while under contract. 
The Navy’s interpretation of this law resulted in the Aviation Officer 
Continuation Pay (AOCP) program. Initially made available to all Naval Aviators who 
had completed their MSR, AOCP offered contracts of one to four years. These bonuses 
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were paid as a function of base pay, with junior officers receiving greater compensation 
(ACCP PM, personnal communication, March 19, 2014).5 
The Uniformed Services Pay Act of 1981 restricted AOCP contracts to requests 
submitted by Navy officers between October 14, 1981 and September 30, 1982. 
Furthermore, this law excluded officers on AOCP contracts from receiving the increase 
in ACIP rates enacted by the same law. 
AOCP was not authorized in FY-1983, but would again be implemented under the 
Defense Authorization Act (1984). Under this legislation, AOCP contracts were limited 
to pilots with at least six—but fewer than 11—years of active service, who had also 
completed their MSR and had not previously accepted an AOCP contract. Bonuses were 
offered for three-, four-, and six-year agreements, with annual payments of $4,000 for the 
former and $6,000 for the latter two. Despite the law’s expressed intention to limit the 
bonus to “aviation specialties where shortages actually exist,” the Navy, under the 
authority granted by the 1984 Appropriations Act, made AOCP contracts available to all 
pilots who met the service requirements and had not already accepted a retention contract 
(USD(P&R), 2011). 
In the following fiscal year’s retention program (FY-1985), the Navy would 
reverse precedence and offer AOCP contracts only to pilots in communities with 
identified retention shortfalls. These were primarily carrier-based communities. 
Additionally, as a means of further increasing the retention of select aviators, a 100% up-
front bonus was offered for pilots in carrier-based tactical aviation communities (ACCP 
PM, personnal communication, March 19, 2014).6 The AOCP would be reenacted with 
no changes for Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987. 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (1987) 
made a number of changes to AOCP. This included re-authorizing retention bonuses for 
NFOs and reinstating the maximum allowable payment to four months basic pay for each 
                                                 
5 This information was communicated via an internal report summarizing the history of aviation 
retention bonus programs. 
6 Ibid. 
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year of additional service. This act also authorized six-year contracts for officers with less 
than eight years of active duty service. Additionally, it removed the provision that 
restricted officers under an AOCP contract be prohibited from receiving the increased 
ACIP rates enacted September 30, 1981. These changes enabled the Navy to offer 
officers long-term contracts with annual payments of $8,000 at key career decision 
points. When coupled with the increased ACIP rates, the increased bonus amounts were 
thought to provide a significant incentive for aviators to remain in the Navy rather than 
departing for the airline industry (USD(P&R), 2011). 
b. Aviation Continuation Pay (FY-1989 through FY-1999) 
Changes were instituted under the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Year 1989 (1988). This revised program—re-labeled Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP)—
shifted the focus of the bonus program to junior officers. ACP reduced the upper 
eligibility limit from 18 to 13 years of commissioned service. It also authorized annual 
payments of up to $12,000 for officers with at least six years of commissioned service 
who agreed to remain on active duty through year 14. Bonuses were solely targeted at 
communities with demonstrated retention shortfalls and maximum bonus payments went 
only to those with the greatest shortages of aviators. The law also enacted a provision for 
the recoupment of funds from officers who failed to complete the service required in their 
contract. Although as a matter of policy, the Navy did not seek to recoup all such funds 
(ACCP PM, personnal communication, March 19, 2014).7 
From 1988 through 1994, the overarching structure of the ACP program remained 
constant. We found one aspect that did fluctuate: the eligibility of various communities 
and the amounts offered to them. A number of communities were eliminated from ACP 
eligibility altogether based on their excess retention or schedule decommissioning (ACCP 
PM, personnal communication, March 19, 2014).8 
Beginning with the FY-1995 program, available ACP contracts were not 
authorized for communities deemed “non-critical” due to large inventories of officers in 




key Year Groups. The remaining communities, designated as “critical,” were authorized 
only a fixed number of contracts as determined by their DH requirements. To support this 
goal, an administrative ACP board was established to screen applicants and award 
contracts based on individual performance records and community requirements (Chief 
of Naval Operations (CNO), 1996). The FY-1995 program further reduced ACP 
eligibility to officers whose MSRs would expire in FY-1995. By mid-year, however, 
insufficient applications for ACP would not achieve DH quotas. To achieve quotas, the 
program was expanded to include officers with MSRs expiring in both FY-1994 and FY-
1995 (ACCP PM, personnal communication, March 19, 2014).9 
In the subsequent year, the FY-1996 program again selected only aviators whose 
obligated service requirements ended between Fiscal Years 1993 and 1996. Financial 
constraints, however, would further limit eligibility, resulting in a number of 
communities that warranted ACP (based on established retention standards) not being 
authorized for the bonus. By mid-year, under increasing fiscal pressures, the entire ACP 
program was suspended (ACCP PM, personnal communication, March 19, 2014).10 
The retention bonus program was reauthorized and expanded for FY-1997. In 
addition to increasing the number of communities eligible for ACP, for the first time 
since the FY-1992 bonus eligibility was reinstated for NFOs—albeit only in specific 
communities. The program also standardized bonus amounts at $12,000 per year for all 
eligible communities with the exception of HS and VQ(P) pilots. They were capped at 
$10,000 and $9,000, respectively (CNO, 1996). 
In 1997, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (1997) 
raised ACP annual bonus amounts to their current limit of $25,000 per year. The Navy 
continued to target specific aviator year groups and communities. The ACP board 
continued to validate ACP applications. In response to fleet perception that ACP was 
becoming a pre-screen for DH, however, applicants were no longer ranked according to 
performance, and contract availability was no longer limited to DH requirements. Still 




under financial constraints, ACP was not offered to VQ(P) NFOs or HSL pilots despite 
those communities having retention rates that warranted eligibility (ACCP PM, personnal 
communication, March 19, 2014).11 
Restrained by current legislation, the FY-1999 ACP program served as a 
transition to the proposed FY-2000 program and “marked the beginning of a new 
direction in naval aviation compensation policy, designed to ensure the Navy retains 
experienced Aviation Officers.” This was done by extending ACP eligibility to all 
aviators from Year Groups 1987 and junior who would have satisfied their MSR in FY-
1999. These cohorts corresponded with the aviators who would soon be asked to 
complete either their second sea duty or DH tour. Contracts were standardized as two-
year agreements with $12,000 annual payments, regardless of the community (CNO, 
1998). 
c. Aviation Career Continuation Pay (FY-2000 to Present) 
Following four years of failing to meet ACP retention goals, the Navy pursued 
congressional support for a retention program that was not limited to increasing the 
retention of aviators in communities with a demonstrated inability to meet DH 
requirements. The Navy argued instead for a need to focus on the larger goal of retaining 
the experienced aviators necessary to support the Navy's mission and maintain combat 
readiness (CNO, 1999). These requests were implemented in the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (1999), which brought positive changes to the 
Navy’s retention efforts.  
The Redesignated Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP) program was 
developed to be a sea- and performance-based incentive program aimed at convincing 
“high quality aviation officers to consider naval aviation as their primary career choice” 
(CNO, 1999, para. b).” To this end, ACCP would: authorize multiple retention contracts 
for officers throughout their aviation careers; reinstate eligibility for officers below the 
rank of O-7; and increase the recently reduced upper service eligibility limit from 14 
years to 25 years of commissioned service (CNO, 1999). 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
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The Navy’s FY-2000 ACCP program specifically used this authority to offer a 
standardized short-term (two- or three-year) contract. It stipulated paying $15,000 per 
year to all eligible aviators on “due course” (i.e., following a career path that was in-line 
with the Naval Aviation Community’s values) through the Post-Command Commander 
(O-5). Less than desired take-rates, however, led to a mid-year revision that offered long-
term (five-year) contracts of $25,000 per year to first-time eligible pilots and $15,000 per 
year to first-time eligible NFOs. Additionally, first-time eligible aviators were authorized 
to request an up-front, 50% lump sum payment. This revision also extended short-term 
contract eligibility to Captains (O-6) with fewer than 24 years of aviation service and 
who served in designated command billets (ACCP PM, personnal communication March 
19, 2014).12 
ACCP for FY-2001 would follow the same format as the revised FY-2000 
program. One exception was made to allow for a more equitable transition from ACP to 
ACCP, wherein aviators in Year Groups 1990 and junior who had completed an ACP 
contract were offered a short-term contract at the long-term rates. Standard short-term 
contracts were divided into five “due course” categories, offering a standardized $15,000 
per year for contracts of two to five years depending on the assignment (CNO, 2000). 
The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2002 (2001) modified 
ACCP by authorizing “early” eligibility to aviators within one year of completing their 
MSRs. With an advance notification requirement of nine to twelve months for 
resignation, this early payment option provided a “substantial additional financial 
incentive prior to the period when an aviator would be making the critical stay-leave 
decision” (ACCP PM, personnal communication, March 19, 2014).13 
No changes were made in the FY-2003 ACCP program from the previous year, 
and the only change to the FY-2004 program was the additional requirement to withhold 
any lump sum payments until an aviator successfully screened for DH. ACCP for FY-
2005 eliminated the short-term contract option for aviators completing their initial MSR, 
                                                 
12 This information was communicated via internal report summarizing history of ACCP. 
13 Ibid. 
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limiting their options to a five-year contract. This ensured that any officers retained 
would remain in service through their aviation DH screen board. The FY-2005 ACCP 
program also formally established the Navy’s policy for stopping annual payments for 
officers who twice failed to screen for DH (CNO, 2004). 
The FY-2006 through FY-2009 ACCP programs followed the FY-2005 format; 
there were changes, however. In an effort to increase NFO retention rates, the long-term 
agreements were set at $25,000 per year for all aviators. Additionally, the short-term 
contracts were put into three categories, all paying $15,000 per year: sea duty, command, 
and aviation-designated astronauts. The short-term contract for aviation-designated 
astronauts would be discontinued in FY-2008 and reinstated in FY-2009. A short-term 
contract for Aviation Engineering Duty Officers (AEDOs) who screened for command 
was established in FY-2008, only to be discontinued in FY-2009 (ACCP PM, personnal 
communication, March 19, 2014).14 
In FY-2010, changes in Force structure resulted in ACCP changing to offer a 
more “appropriate incentive.” These changes included reducing the NFO long-term 
contract to $15,000 per year. The annual payment for the short-term sea duty and 
command contracts were reduced to $10,000 and $12,000, respectively. Additionally, 
Captains (O-6) and Commanders (O-5) selected for promotion were no longer eligible for 
ACCP (CNO, 2010). 
The ACCP program saw multiple revisions in FY-2011. Based on CNP guidance 
to reduce the overall cost of the ACCP program, contracts were structured to offer 
varying bonus amounts based on projected retention rates for individual communities. 
This resulted in the establishment of nine pilot and six NFO categories. Under this new 
design, 13 categories saw reductions in bonus amounts; one category remained stable; 
and one category had the bonus amount increased. As an additional cost savings measure, 
the lump sum option was discontinued. ACCP continued under the same format for FY-
2012 and FY-2013. In response to changes in projected retention, the FY-2012 program 
increased bonus amounts for eight categories and decreased the bonus offered in one 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
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category. Under this ACCP program, short-term sea duty and command contracts were 
no longer offered. The FY-2013 ACCP program would again increase the bonuses 
offered in five categories, while only one category saw a reduction in the bonus offered. 
The FY-2014 program increased bonus amounts for three communities, but otherwise 
mirrored the FY-2013 program (ACCP PM, personnal communication, March 19, 
2014)15 (CNO, 2013). 
2. Current Retention Bonus Implementation 
a. Enactment 
(1) Congressional Legislation. ACCP is legislated under Title 37 U.S. C. 
§301b (2014). In addition to any other pay and allowances, it authorizes the Secretary of 
the Navy to pay a retention bonus to any aviation officer who prior to December 31, 2014 
executes a written agreement to remain on active duty for at least one year, providing that 
the officer: 
 is entitled to receive ACIP; 
 is below the rank of O-7; 
 is qualified to perform operational flying duty; and 
 has completed, or is within one year of completing, any service 
commitment incurred for undergraduate flight training. 
The amount authorized for this bonus is not to exceed $25,000 per year of service 
agreed upon in the contract, and it is to be prorated to ensure the contract does not extend 
beyond the officer’s twenty-fifth year of aviation service. Upon acceptance of the 
agreement, the Secretary may elect to have the amount paid as a lump sum or in 
installments. Additionally, these funds are subject to recoupment if the officer fails to 
complete the agreed upon service requirement. 
(2) U.S. Navy Policy. The Navy’s current retention program, ACCP, is 
defined by OPNAV Instruction 7220.9 (CNO, 2005a). Under this instruction, the 
authority to evaluate, accept, and administer ACCP contracts is delegated to Commander 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
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Naval Personnel Command, Aviation Officer Assignments Branch (PERS-43), provided 
the aviator submitting the contract meets the provisions of Title 37 U.S. C. §301b and, 
furthermore: 
 is not subject to mandatory separation from active service within one year 
from the date ACCP would be paid; 
 has not twice failed to select for promotion to the next higher pay grade, 
unless selected for continuation; 
 if, having transitioned from NFO to pilot, has completed the service 
obligation incurred during pilot training; and 
 is recommended for ACCP by his or her Commanding Officer (CNO, 
2005a). 
b. Implementation 
Previous versions of ACCP offered retention contracts of differing lengths and 
amounts to aviators in various career stages. The focus of the current and recent ACCP 
programs, however, has been the retention of active duty Naval Aviators who have 
completed their initial MSR and have between seven and 12 years of aviation service. To 
incentivize these officers to “Stay Navy,” the ACCP program offers five-year contracts, 
payable in equal annual installments. These contracts are offered at an aviator’s first stay-
go decision point and are structured, based on current tour lengths, to retain them through 
their Department Head tour (ACCP PM, personal communication, January 13, 2014).16 
c. Announcement and Eligibility Periods 
The details of each year’s ACCP program are released to the fleet via a Navy-
specific Administrative Message (NAVADMIN). Included in these NAVADMINs are 
eligibility requirements, changes deemed pertinent from the previous year, bonus 
amounts, and types of contracts offered. Additionally, the dates in which ACCP requests 
will be accepted are also announced (typically upon release of the NAVADMIN until late 
in the fiscal year). Table 4 lists the dates on which annual ACCP programs were 
                                                 
16 This information was communicated via internal report on FY 2013 ACCP performance. 
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announced and the final dates in which ACCP requests must be received by PERS-43 for 
all annual ACCP programs since FY-2004. 
 
 
Table 4.   ACCP Contract Acceptance Periods (after CNO 2003, 2004, 2005b, 
2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) 
Under these submission periods, aviators have two opportunities in which they 
may choose to request ACCP. The first, termed early eligibility, occurs the fiscal year 
prior to the expiration of an aviator’s MSR. An aviator who elects to submit an ACCP 
contract during early eligibility will be obligated to the additional service once this 
request is accepted by PERS-43. This includes receiving the currently offered ACCP 
bonus as six equal, annual installments. The first payment occurs one year prior to the 
expiration on the aviator’s MSR, and the remaining five payments are made on 
subsequent anniversaries of this date (CNO, 2013). 
The second period, which occurs in the fiscal year the aviator’s MSR expires, is 
the initial eligibility period. Aviators who submit ACCP requests during their initial 
eligibility period are also obligated to complete the additional service once the contract 
has been accepted by PERS-43. Bonuses are paid at the amount offered under the current 
ACCP program and are divided into five equal, annual payments, with the first payment 
being made upon the expiration of their MSR or the acceptance of their ACCP contract, 
FY-14 ---------- ----------- ---------
FY-13 27-Feb-2013 30-Aug-2013 184
FY-12 13-Feb-2012 30-Aug-2012 199
FY-11 18-May-2011 30-Aug-2011 104
FY-10 26-Jan-2010 23-Sep-2010 240
FY-09 21-Jan-2009 24-Sep-2009 246
FY-08 15-Dec-2007 25-Sep-2008 285
FY-07 29-Dec-2006 30-Sep-2007 275
FY-06 27-Dec-2005 30-Sep-2006 277
FY-05 9-Dec-2004 30-Sep-2005 295












whichever is later. Subsequent payments are made on the anniversary of their MSR 
expiration (CNO, 2013). 
The majority of aviators who do submit ACCP contracts do so during their first 
eligibility windows. As Table 5 illustrates, 63 to 91% of all officers retained under the 
ACCP program signed up during early eligibility. Prior to 2011, on average, only 10% of 
eligible aviators would submit ACCP contracts during their initial eligibility period 
(NPC, 2014, February 3), although PERS-43 has noted: 
With the reintroduction of bonus amounts based on individual community 
retention needs, a larger percentage of aviators have deferred requesting 
ACCP until their second eligibility period. To meet fiscal year DH 
requirements from the large groups of officers in their second year of 
eligibility has required that the Navy raise the offered yearly dollar 
amounts. This begins a cycle of large fluctuations in bonus amounts, as 
once requirements are met the dollar amounts are decreased in subsequent 
years to minimize excess retention. The resultant sine-wave effect leads to 
a lack of officer behavioral predictability and detracts from their ability to 
make informed career decisions. (ACCP PM, personal communication, 
March 19, 2014).17 
 
(Note: Critical Year is defined as the year in which aviators complete their MSR) 
Table 5.   ACCP Contract “Take-Rates” (FY-2004 to FY-2014) (after ACCP PM, 
personal communication, 2014, March 19)18 
                                                 




d. Retention Goals and Performance 
The Navy’s target retention goals for ACCP are set according to annualized fleet 
aviation DH requirements for both operational and operational training squadrons. This 
projected annualized requirement through FY-2018 is approximately 330 aviation DHs. 
Historically, to meet retention demands the Navy has sought to retain approximately 50% 
of the DH eligible population via ACCP. Allowing for an attrition or DH non-selection 
rate of nine percent, PERS-43 set aggregate annual take-rate goals of between 350 and 
360 aviators for FY-2014 through FY-2018 (ACCP PM, personal communication, 2014, 
January 13).19 
As Table 6 illustrates, while ACCP appears to have improved in achieving the 
desired “take-rate” for the naval aviation community as a whole, the “take-rates” of 
individual communities can vary considerably. Excess retention in several communities 
(e.g., HSL/HSM pilot, VFA NFO), moreover, has compensated for dramatic under-
retention in others (e.g., VAQ pilot, VQ(T) NFO). As aviators at the DH level are largely 
non-interchangeable, the failure of ACCP to meet targeted fleet requirements is masked 
by the aggregate “take-rate.” 
 
Table 6.   Percent Attained of Annualized “Take-Rate” Goals (FY-2011 through 
FY-2013) (after ACCP PM, personal communication March 19, 2014)20 
                                                 
19 This information was communicated via internal report on FY 2013 ACCP program. 
20 This information was communicated via MS Excel spreadsheets detailing FY 2011 through FY 
2013 ACCP performance.  
Fiscal Year 2011 2012 2013 Fiscal Year 2011 2012 2013
TOTAL 80.1% 97.3% 91.7% TOTAL 76.2% 83.3% 116.1%
HM 80.0% 100.0% 116.7% VAQ 52.9% 60.0% 88.2%
HS/HSC 80.9% 81.4% 120.8% VFA 121.4% 121.4% 35.7%
HSL/HSM 157.1% 102.0% 162.5% VAW/VRC 57.1% 120.0% 194.4%
VAQ 75.0% 80.0% 36.4% VP 92.6% 82.4% 146.4%
VFA 82.3% 105.0% 75.8% VQ(P) 87.5% 62.5% 87.5%
VAW/VRC 55.6% 75.0% 88.9% VQ(T) 50.0% 33.3% 62.5%
VP 57.1% 100.0% 74.2%
VQ(P) 40.0% 100.0% 66.7%
VQ(T) 80.0% 140.0% 75.0% Fiscal Year 2011 2012 2013




We found that these excesses and shortfalls in targeted retention goals impact 
naval aviation both financially and operationally. In FY-2011, specific communities 
retained a total of 19 aviators above their targeted goals at an additional cost to the Navy 
of $950,000. At the same time, other communities were a combined 76 aviators short of 
retention targets. This resulted in a targeted retention (i.e., corrected for retained aviators 
capable of meeting specific community requirements) shortfall of 24% of the Navy’s 
goal. In FY-2012, the results were somewhat improved, with only 12 excess aviators 
retained at an additional cost of $850,000 to the Navy. Targeted aviator shortfalls fell to 
39 for a targeted retention rate of 87%. The trend worsened in FY-2013, with the 
retention of 71 excess aviators costing the Navy an additional $5,325,000. Meanwhile, 
other communities fell 51 aviators short of retention goals for a targeted retention rate of 
85%. Table 7 summarizes these results. (See Appendix C for a detailed summary of 
recent ACCP performance.) In addition to the monetary costs associated with over- 
retention, the under-retention experienced in specific communities results in DH billets 
having to be “gapped” (i.e., left unfilled until a suitable replacement can be found) or 
extending the tour lengths of those selected for DH (ACCP PM, personal communication 
2014, March 19).21 
 
 
Table 7.   Summary of ACCP Performance (FY-2011 through FY-2013) (after 
ACCP PM, personal communication, March 19, 2014)22 
                                                 
21 This information was communicated via internal report on recommendation for FY 2014 ACCP 
program. 
 
22 This information was communicated via MS Excel spreadsheets detailing FY 2011 through FY 
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FY-2013 36.1% 106.0% 76.4% 28,775,000$   71 51 5,325,000$       18.5%
FY-2012 31.2% 92.1% 88.6% 22,900,000$   12 39 850,000$          3.7%
FY-2011 31.5% 82.3% 76.4% 18,700,000$   19 76 950,000$          5.1%
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e. Bonus Calculation and Amounts 
Despite having specific targeted retention numbers, the Navy does not limit the 
number of available annual ACCP contracts, and PERS-43 makes no determination as to 
the suitability of aviators requesting ACCP—accepting all valid submissions (CNO, 
2013). Instead, to minimize projected shortfalls or excesses in retention, the bonus 
amount offered to each community is reviewed and adjusted annually. Taking into 
account “recent ACCP ‘take-rates,’ community continuation rates, eligible aviator 
population size, and expected economic climate,” each community is categorized using 
the following criteria (ACCP PM, personnal communication, March 19, 2014): 
 Criteria A (reduce bonus to minimize excess retention): A significant 
number of “initial” eligible aviators are in a Year Group (YG) that had 
already met or was close to meeting its DH goal, and they were not needed 
to make later year goals. 
 Criteria B (maintain or reduce bonus to balance requirements and 
minimize excess retention): A significant number of “initial” eligibles are 
in a YG that is needed to meet DH goals, yet there is also a significant 
portion of remaining “early” eligibles and aviators who are not yet eligible 
from the same YG that will have opportunities to take ACCP. 
 Criteria C (increase bonus amount): Significant retention from the “initial” 
eligibles is required. 
 Criteria D (maintain or increase bonus to balance requirements and 
minimize excess retention): Decreasing or sustained retention is indicated 
by low “early” eligible take rates for a YG (ACCP PM, personnal 
communication, March 19, 2014).23 
Once each community is categorized and retention projections estimated, the 
amount of ACCP to offer each community is determined in part by the findings of a 2006 
CNA report’s suggestion that a “$1,000-per-year increase in ACCP was associated with a 
0.6% increase in retention rates” (Hansen & Moskowitz, 2006). Table 8 lists what the 
report determined to be the effect on retention rates of a $1,000-per-year increase in 
ACCP for three categories of pilots. 
                                                 





Table 8.   ACCP Effects on Pilot Retention (from Hansen & Moskowitz, 2006) 
Table 9 illustrates the changes to the five-year bonus amounts since these criteria 
have been implemented under the current iteration of ACCP. As can be noted, all bonuses 
have increased back towards or beyond pre-2011 levels. Furthermore, bonus amounts 
have only been reduced for two communities following the initial conversion to the 
community-based system: a $25,000 reduction for HSM pilots in FY-2012 and a $25,000 
reduction for the VFA NFOs in FY-2013. These reductions were negated in the following 
year with increases of $50,000. 
 
 
Table 9.   ACCP Five-Year Contract Bonus (FY-2010 through FY-2014) (after 
ACCP PM, personal communication, 2014, March 18) 
f. Contract Requirements and Termination 
The intent of the Navy’s current implementation of ACCP is to retain qualified 
aviators through their DH tour. As such, all officers accepting ACCP agree not to 
voluntarily resign, retire, or terminate the flight status prior to completing the MSR 
Type of 
Pilot
Increase in Retention 
Rate with $1,000-per-





incurred. In applying for ACCP, aviators are also stating their intent and desire to 
participate in the DH screening process. Furthermore, officers selected for DH are 
obligated to accept and complete their entire DH tour, even if it extends beyond their 
ACCP incurred MSR. Aviators who twice fail to select for DH are authorized to continue 
receiving ACCP so long as they remain in an aviation-designated assignment (NPC, 
2014, February 3). 
Failure to satisfy contractual requirements results in the termination and possible 
recoupment of unearned bonus payments. Additionally, while repayment is not required, 
Naval Aviators have all future ACCP payments terminated under the following 
conditions: 
 Medical grounding or other suspension of flight status, which is neither 
the result of misconduct, nor willful neglect, nor incurred during a period 
of unauthorized absence 
 Twice failing to select for advancement to the next pay grade 
 Separation from Active Duty by operation of law or Department of 
Defense (DOD) policy, except separations for cause 
 Redesignation, or selection for lateral transfer, after twice failing to select 
for DH (CNO, 2005a) 
While the majority of aviators from the most recent ACCP programs have not yet 
been subject to statutory and administrative selection boards, the recent historical (FY-
2004 through FY-2009) early-termination/revocation rate has been 16.2% of the total 
contracts issued. While the Navy has been able to recoup some of the ACCP issued, 
nearly $4.5 million in ACCP is spent annually on retaining aviators who will not 
complete the DH tour for which they were retained. We found that the most common 
reasons for the early termination or revocation of ACCP are failure to promote to the next 
pay grade or failure to be selected for DH. Other reasons include officers opting out of 
the DH selection board or declining orders to a DH assignment. Less common reasons 
include medical-related disqualifications or non-performance-related issues (e.g., family, 
marital) that result in an aviator not being able to perform his or her duties. Additionally, 
aviators who are removed from aviation duty as the result of a Field Naval Aviation 
Evaluation Board (FNAEB) or Detached for Caused make up less than four percent of the 
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ACCP contracts terminated. Table 10 summarizes these results (ACCP PM, personal 
communication, 2014, January 13).24 
 
 
Table 10.   Causes for Early Termination/Revocation of ACCP (FY-2004 to FY-
2013) (after ACCP PM, personal communication, 2014, January 13)25 
 
                                                 
24 This information was communicated via MS Excel spreadsheet summarizing individual ACCP 






















FY-2013 252 0 0.0% 0 0 0 0 0 -$               -$               
FY-2012 277 13 4.7% 11 2 0 0 0 341,664$       658,336$       
FY-2011 265 22 8.3% 12 5 2 2 1 382,500$       1,342,500$    
FY-2010 252 34 13.5% 24 5 3 1 1 1,510,841$    1,889,161$    
FY-2009 495 98 19.8% 42 37 9 5 5 6,470,790$    5,445,876$    
FY-2008 426 59 13.8% 21 33 4 1 2 4,012,525$    3,362,475$    
FY-2007 381 64 16.8% 12 39 7 4 2 4,747,946$    3,227,054$    
FY-2006 395 73 18.5% 4 48 12 5 4 5,655,088$    3,469,906$    
FY-2005 394 56 14.2% 3 38 11 3 1 3,004,951$    2,582,549$    


















III. INTRODUCTION TO AUCTIONS 
In this chapter, we discuss the fundamental principles of Auction Theory and their 
application to the issue of Naval Aviator retention. Additionally, to better understand how 
auctions function, in sections B and C we discuss key concepts and features of auctions. 
Readers with a sufficient understanding of these topics may skip these sections. For 
additional information on auction theory, refer to Krishna (2009). For additional 
information on the application of auctions to military Force management refer to 
Coughlan and Gates (Coughlan & Gates, 2012). 
A. BACKGROUND AND APPLICATION 
Auctions in the general sense are one of several market mechanisms used to 
facilitate the transfer of goods and services in a market-based economy. So, while the 
DOD’s interest in the employment of auctions has grown in recent years (USD (P&R), 
2008), auctions have in fact been used throughout human history. The range of assets 
sold at auction varies from irreplaceable works of art to heaping mounds of base metals. 
Also, they range from the intangible right to broadcast on the electro-magnetic spectrum 
to the sordid trade of human flesh. Auctions take place at every level of society, from 
county fairs to dedicated online websites, and they even occur in the high-stakes dealings 
of Wall Street. A common link in these situations is that the information asymmetry (i.e., 
one party’s uncertainty regarding the value other parties might place on the object) is 
sufficient to dissuade the parties involved from agreeing on a fixed price at the onset of 
the transaction (Krishna, 2009). 
We assert that the significance of conducting these types of exchanges as a 
posted-price transaction (i.e., where one party establishes a set price at which they are 
willing to buy or sell the product or service in question) can be seen in a hypothetical 
example of the Navy’s current aviation retention efforts. As Figure 1 illustrates, in order 
to reach the retention goal of 50 aviators, the Navy must offer a bonus of $80,000. This 
precise amount is not available a priori and can result in retention shortfalls for 





Figure 1.  The Importance of Retention Bonus Precision (after Coughlan & Gates, 
2012) 
As Figure 2 illustrates, these consequences are not limited to the hypothetical. 
Despite the Navy’s efforts to establish optimal ACCP bonuses based on individual 
aviation community retention requirements, some communities experienced retention as 
high as 94% above goals, while others achieved only 36% of desired retention. An 
analysis of recent ACCP programs reveals that this is a persistent issue for Navy Force 




Figure 2.  FY-2013 ACCP Bonus Amounts versus Aviator Retention for Select 
Communities (after ACCP PM, personal communication, 2014, January 
13)26 
Exploring the potential to remedy the shortcomings of the current retention 
system with an auction mechanism, Coughlan and Gates (2012) discuss auction design 
and its application to military retention. Figure 3 depicts several design considerations 
they deemed important in auction mechanism development. The highlighted elements are 
features best suited for a mechanism designed to support military retention efforts. These 
characteristics serve as the foundation for the auction mechanisms used in our research 
and we discuss them in greater detail in the following sections. 
                                                 





Figure 3.  Force Management Auction Design Considerations (from Coughlan & 
Gates, 2012) 
B. AUCTION ROLES AND TERMINOLOGY 
In this section, we present a discriminatory compilation of previous NPS theses 
on Auction Theory. Much of the information here has been provided courtesy of the 
following theses authors: William N. Filip, Henning Hansen Homb, and Tony K. 
Verenna.  
1. Roles 
Auctions can vary significantly depending on their specific rules. There are 
certain roles and concepts that are integral to all auctions. Among these are the roles of 
bidders, bid takers, sellers, and buyers. Bidders are the individuals or interests competing 
against each other to win the auction. The bid takers are the entities who receive the price 
offers made by the bidders. The seller is the participant who offers to provide a good or 
service for the right price. Conversely, the buyer is the entity seeking to obtain the good 
or service. Additionally, in any auction that is consummated there is at least one winner—
the bidder awarded either the object being auctioned or the right to provide said object 
(Filip, 2006). 
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2. Matching Auctions to Transactions 
As we previously noted, Auction Mechanisms may be applied to a wide variety of 
transactions. Figure 4 summarizes the types of market mechanisms best suited for 
transactions between various combinations of sellers and buyers. Transactions between 
single parties are typically completed through negotiation. Those between multiple 
buyers and sellers are generally conducted through non-auction transaction 
mechanisms—stock exchanges being notable exceptions. Transactions between single 
buyers and multiple sellers or single buyers and multiple buyers, however, are typically 
completed as some form of auction (Coughlan & Gates, 2012). 
 
Figure 4.  Varieties of Transaction Mechanisms (from Coughlan & Gates, 2012) 
a. Forward versus Reverse Auctions 
(1) Forward Auction. A forward auction is the most common and familiar 
type of auction. This is because it is often associated with famous auction houses and on-
line auction sites. It involves a single seller and multiple potential buyers bidding for the 
right to purchase the good or service at auction. In these auctions, competition among 
bidders drives prices higher, and winning bidders are those who submit the highest bids 
(Coughlan & Gates, Auction mechanisms for force management, 2012). 
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(2) Reverse Auction. A reverse auction consists of one buyer and multiple 
sellers vying for the right to provide a good or service. This format is often used in the 
procurement context, in which several contractors bid for the right to sell their products 
or services to a single buyer. In reverse auctions, therefore, competition among bidders 
drives prices lower, and the winning bidders are those who submit the lowest bids 
(Coughlan & Gates, Auction mechanisms for force management, 2012). 
b. Single- versus Multi-Unit Auctions 
(1) Single-Unit Auctions. In a single-unit auction, one good or service is 
auctioned at any one time. This aspect can be driven by the seller offering only a single 
good or service (single-unit supply) in a forward auction, or it may be due to the buyer 
only wishing to acquire a single good or service (single-unit demand) in a reverse 
auction. While the simple single-object auction has been extensively researched (e.g., 
McAfee & McMillan, 1987; Krishna, 2009), the impracticality of conducting hundreds of 
these auctions in any Force management endeavor limits its utility in our research; 
(2) Multi-Unit Auctions. Multi-unit auctions involve auctioning several items 
at one time. This occurs when, in a forward auction, the seller offers multiple units of the 
same good or service (multi-unit supply) or when in a reverse auction the buyer seeks to 
obtain multiple units of the same good or service (multi-unit demand). While it may be 
convenient to treat a multi-unit auction as a number of independent single-unit auctions, 
this is inappropriate when the value of the item at auction depends on other items for 
auction that can serve as either complements or substitutes (Verenna, 2007).  
C. FACTORS FOR DETERMINING BIDDING STRATEGIES 
1. Perceptions of Value 
In most cases, participants have imperfect and differing knowledge about either 
the item for auction or the value others place on said item. The nature of this asymmetric 
information can be used to describe auctions under two general models. On the one hand 
are common value auctions where, knowing the true nature of the item at auction, all 
bidders would assign it the same value. The other class is private value auctions, where 
each bidder’s value is completely independent of the valuations of other bidders. While 
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most auctions contain aspects of both models, they can be treated as polar cases to 
explain how bidders establish different measures of value and, ultimately, their bids 
(Homb, 2007). 
a. Common Value Auctions 
In common value auctions, the value of the object being auctioned is equally 
valued by all the participants. Individual participants, however, may have different 
information about the potential value of the item. An example of this type of auction is 
the sale of mineral rights to a plot of land. Were the true quantities of minerals to be 
found on that plot known, all the participants would place approximately the same value 
on the right to mine those resources. As this cannot be known with absolute certainty, 
potential buyers are obliged to develop their own estimates as to the value of the mineral 
rights. The most optimistic bidders place higher bids. Additionally, discovering what 
value other bidders place on those rights may cause a bidder to change his own valuation. 
The asymmetric information present in common value auctions can give rise to the 
winner’s curse. This is when auction winners realize that they overestimated the good's 
value and suffer a loss as a result of their over-bidding (Homb, 2007).. 
b. Independent Private-Values Auctions 
In independent private-values auctions, each bidder establishes a private and 
intrinsic value for the item. Unlike a common value auction, an individual’s estimate is 
unaffected by any information about the value other bidders place on the object. While in 
practice a bidder might adjust a bid upon discovering another participant’s value of the 
item for auction, as McAfee and McMillan (1987) explain, this is due to strategic reasons 
and not because the bidder’s value of the object has changed. Common examples of this 
type of auction include the sale of memorabilia (when not intended for resale) and tickets 
to attend concerts or sporting events (Homb, 2007).. 
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2. Reserve and Reservation Prices 
a. Reserve Price 
The reserve price relates to the bid taker in a forward auction and is the minimum 
price they are willing to accept in exchange for providing the good or service. In a 
reverse auction, the reserve price is the maximum price a bid taker is willing to pay in 
exchange for a good or service. In theory, bid takers in a forward auction should not 
accept any offers below reserve price. This is because they will derive no profit from the 
transaction. The same follows for bid takers accepting offers above their reserve price in 
a reverse auction. In a forward auction, the bid taker should accept any offer above the 
reserve price (the opposite is true for a reverse auction). In all cases, an offer exactly 
equal to the bid taker’s reserve price would result in a scenario in which the bid taker is 
equally willing to accept or reject the offer (Verenna, 2007). 
b. Reservation Price 
The concept of a reservation price applies to bidders. This is defined as either the 
maximum value a bidder places on a good or service being auctioned (forward auction) 
or the minimum value a bidder places on having to provide a good or service (reverse 
auction). Similarly to a bid taker’s reserve price, in theory bidders should not offer any 
bids above reservation price in a forward auction nor should they offer bids below their 
reservation price in a reverse auction. In all cases, an offer exactly equal to the bidder’s 
reservation price would result in a scenario in which the bidder is equally willing to have 
the offer rejected or accepted (Verenna, 2007). 
3. Bidding Strategies 
a. Descending-Bid and First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions 
In these auction formats, the winner pays or receives whatever amount is bid. 
Therefore, the bidder must estimate what others are likely to bid to maximize any 
potential profits from winning. Knowing this information, a rational bidder will submit a 
bid that maximizes the chances of winning while still providing an acceptable level of 
profit or surplus. “Ultimately, this results in a bidder offering some amount less than their 
reservation price in a forward auction and some amount more in a reverse auction. 
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Exactly how much less depends upon the probability distribution of the other bidders’ 
valuations and the number of competing bidders” (Filip, 2006, p. 25). 
b. Ascending-Bid and Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions 
In these auction formats, the highest bid is used to determine the winner. The 
amount paid or received, however, depends largely (if not entirely) on the bids of others. 
As such, it is in the bidders’ own interests to submit offers equal to their reservation 
values.27 Figure 5 illustrates this aspect by depicting bidding strategies and their possible 
outcomes in a second-price forward auction.28 As depicted, in no scenario does under-
bidding or over-bidding result in an outcome that is more favorable to a bidder. In any 
scenario in which the bidder has the winning bid, the same price is paid. Moreover, by 
not bidding the true reservation value, bidders run the risk of losing the auction to an 
offer below what they were willing to pay or obligating themselves to pay more than they 
value the object. The results in a reverse auction are similar, save that the bidder risks 
committing to a price below the reservation value by under-bidding or not capitalizing on 
an acceptable price by over-bidding. “Despite the differing bidding strategies employed 
in the various auction formats, on average the revenue generated will be the same” 
(Krishna, 2009, p. 26). 
                                                 
27 In the case of an ascending bid auction, the buyers (sellers) may begin with bids below (above) their 
reservation value, but should bid beyond this value. For the pronoun “their” to agree with the nouns here, 
they have to be plural. 
28 Because a bidder in an ascending bid auction need only exceed the bids of others by some 





Figure 5.  Second-Price Auction Bidding Strategy (after Myung, 2013) 
D. DETERMINING WINNER AND PRICE 
Methods for determining a winner and the price paid can be categorized into four 
general types of auctions: ascending-bid, descending-bid, first-price sealed-bid, and 
second-price sealed-bid. The fundamental aspect of these auction formats is that they 
seek, through bids, to elicit a potential buyer’s value of an asset, and they then assign the 
winner and price paid based solely on the information received. In this sense, the 
specifics of the object(s) for sale are inconsequential. Additionally, details about the 
particulars of the bidders are irrelevant, as they have no influence on who wins the 
auction or how much is paid. When combined with the concepts discussed earlier in this 
chapter, any of these formats can be used to sell any class of good or service. It is 
therefore possible, even if impractical, to buy fleets of classic automobiles via a reverse, 
descending-bid auction or to offer any of the dreck sold by on-line auction sites under a 
second-price sealed-bid auction (Krishna, 2009). 
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1. Ascending-Bid 
Also referred to as English auctions, the ascending-bid format is the most widely 
recognized and most commonly used for the selling of goods (McAfee & McMillan, 
1987). In general, these auctions can be carried out in an interactive turn-based process or 
in real time, with bids submitted through gestures, orally, electronically, or by almost any 
other means. The bidders need not be physically present at the auction. What is 
fundamental to this format is that the price for the object being auctioned continues to 
increase incrementally until only a single buyer remains. The buyer then pays the final 
price quoted by the seller. As an open auction format, in an ascending-bid auction each 
buyer knows the current price and can discern some information as to the value other 
buyers place on the value of the object by observing the submitted bids (Krishna, 2009). 
2. Descending-Bid 
A second open format, the descending-bid is sometimes referred to as a Dutch 
auction. This auction format is structured much like an ascending-bid auction, except that 
in this format the seller starts at a price, ostensibly above what any bidder is willing to 
pay, and then the seller incrementally decreases the price until a willing buyer is 
identified. Here again, buyers have some information as to the value their competitors 
place on the objects being valued; it can be decidedly less valuable, however, as once a 
bid is submitted the auction for that particular object is complete (Krishna, 2009). 
3. First-Price Sealed-Bid 
In this first-price sealed-bid format, potential buyers privately submit a bid for the 
object being auctioned. This is a closed auction format; that is, unlike the open auction 
formats, bidders are not made aware of what other potential buyers have bid. 
Additionally, each bidder may only submit a single bid that cannot be revised. Once all 
the bids have been collected, the bidder who submitted the highest bid is announced as 
the winner and pays the bid price (McAfee & McMillan, 1987). 
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4. Second-Price Sealed-Bid 
The second-price sealed-bid auction format is nearly identical to the first-price 
sealed-bid format: bidders privately submit a single bid for the object being auctioned. 
All bids are collected before a winner is announced. The winner is the bidder submitting 
the highest bid. In the second-price sealed-bid, however, the winner pays not the amount 
bid, but the amount offered in the second-highest bid. This aspect is designed to elicit a 
bidder’s true reservation value (McAfee & McMillan, 1987). 
 
 47 
IV. AUCTION MECHANISMS 
In this section, we discuss the auction mechanisms used in our research: the 
uniform-price auction and two variants of the uniform-price auction, the quality adjusted 
discount (QUAD) auction, and the combinatorial retention auction mechanism (CRAM). 
This chapter draws extensively from the works of Myung (2013) and Coughlan, Gates, 
and Myung (CGM, 2013) for the development and description of the uniform-price, 
QUAD, and CRAM models. We suggest that if more detailed information on these 
auction mechanisms is desired, these documents should be referenced. 
In addition to the favorable characteristics of auctions in general—described in 
Chapter III—we selected these auction mechanisms for their additional normative 
features. This makes them viable options for improving the efficiency of the current 
Naval Aviator retention system. The principles supported by these models include 
allocative efficiency, cost minimization, and failure freeness. Additionally, these 
mechanisms support values identified as critical to any DOD retention program, 
specifically (CGM, 2013): 
 Transparency and ease of use: The strategy employed by these 
mechanisms is designed for ease of understanding and minimizes the 
incentive for aviators to game the auction in an attempt to garner a 
strategic advantage. 
 Egalitarianism: The military has a long history of providing equal pay to 
service members of equal rank and position. Therefore, with the exception 
of QUAD, these mechanisms provide the same bonus amount to all 
retained aviators. 
 Low transaction cost (i.e., minimal time investment participants): 
Allowing for the dispersed nature and limited connectivity of 
servicemembers deployed throughout the world, these mechanisms require 
that aviators only make a single bid. The time allotted for this can be a 
matter of days, weeks, or months.29 Additionally, the nature of these 
mechanisms does not require an aviator to collect any information outside 
personal valuation to make an informed bid (CGM, 2013). 
                                                 
29 The duration of the auction is ultimately a policy-maker decision.  
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A. UNIFORM-PRICE AUCTION 
1. Introduction 
A uniform-price auction is a variant of a second-price sealed-bid auction format. 
In our application, this mechanism is conducted as a single-supply, multi-demand, 
reverse auction with the Navy serving as the bid taker seeking to retain in the Active 
Duty service a specified number of Aviation Officers. The sellers are Naval Aviators who 
submit bids with the price that they are willing to accept in exchange for committing to 
an additional period of service. By providing the flexibility to precisely select the number 
of aviators desired, this mechanism enables the Navy to save the financial costs related to 
over-retention. It also minimizes the risks associated with retention shortfalls. 
Additionally, on average, this mechanism is able to provide an equitable uniform bonus 
to the aviators retained at the same cost of a discretionary auction, in which retained 
aviators are awarded their exact bid.30 
In practice, the Navy announces the quantity of Naval Aviators it seeks to retain 
and collects the sealed bids from individuals willing to be retained. These bids are ranked 
from lowest to highest and the desired number of aviators to retain is selected from the 
lowest bids. All retained aviators receive the same payout. This is equal to the cutoff 
bid—the first excluded bidder’s price. 
Uniform-price auctions are weakly dominant incentive compatible; that is, there is 
no incentive for an aviator to over-bid or under-bid the true reservation value. Table 11 
illustrates how this aspect plays out in various scenarios. As depicted, there is no scenario 
in which over-bidding or under-bidding results in an outcome that is more favorable than 
bidding truthfully. Moreover, by bidding above or below true reservation value, bidders 
can subject themselves to outcomes that are less favorable than bidding truthfully. 
                                                 





Table 11.   Uniform-Price Auction Bidding Strategy (after Myung, 2013) 
2. Model Description 
Aviators      are characterized by their bids      and reservation values       that 
is, the minimum bonus they would accept in exchange for agreeing to remain on Active 
Duty and serve a Department Head Tour. The objective of aviators is to maximize 
payoff        in this case a cash bonus, by submitting bids representative of their 
reservation value. The number of aviators participating in the auction is denoted by N. 
The Navy’s goal is to retain M of aviators. 
The sealed bids are collected and ranked from highest to lowest  {  }   
  . The M 
lowest bids are retained. In the event that more than one aviator submits a bid of     the 
tie will be broken randomly to ensure retention goals are not exceeded.31 The cutoff bid 
is set to     , the first excluded bid. Aviators with         are awarded a bonus of 
     (the cash bonus required by the first aviator not selected for retention) and incur the 
obligated service requirement. Aviators not selected receive no bonus, but are still 
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eligible to remain in the aviation community. They may also separate from Active Duty 
or apply for a lateral transfer at the completion of their MSR. 
3. Example Auction 
Table 12 is an example of a uniform-price auction seeking to retain eight out of 
15 aviators. In this example, the ninth lowest bid of $131,000 is the cutoff bid. All 
aviators with bids less than this amount are retained. These aviators are each awarded a 
$131,000 retention bonus and incur an additional period of obligated service. The total 
cost of retaining the required number of aviators is $1,048,000. 
 
 
Table 12.   Example of Uniform-Price Auction 
BID RANK RETAINED BONUS PAID
61,000$         1 Yes 131,000$        
68,000$         2 Yes 131,000$        
78,000$         3 Yes 131,000$        
81,000$         4 Yes 131,000$        
104,000$       5 Yes 131,000$        
104,000$       6 Yes 131,000$        
106,000$       7 Yes 131,000$        
129,000$       8 Yes 131,000$        
131,000$       9 No -$                 
132,000$       10 No -$                 
134,000$       11 No -$                 
146,000$       12 No -$                 
150,000$       13 No -$                 
165,000$       14 No -$                 
174,000$       15 No -$                 
CUTOFF BID 131,000$     TOTAL COST 1,048,000$    
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B. QUALITY ADJUSTED DISCOUNT (QUAD) AUCTION 
1. Introduction 
The QUAD auction developed by Myung (2013) is a more general form of a 
uniform-price auction.32 With the exceptions of how bids and payouts are determined, 
this mechanism is conducted in the same manner as the simple uniform-price auction 
described in Section A. These key differences enable the buyer to increase the efficiency 
of the auction by giving preferential treatment to specific classes of bidders. In addition 
to the benefits of a simple uniform-price auction (i.e., cost savings and retention 
precision), the QUAD mechanism allows the Navy to control for the quality of aviators 
selected without necessarily increasing the overall costs.33 
In our application, this added consideration is achieved by discounting the bids of 
higher-quality aviators (i.e., aviators more likely to be selected for DH). This discount 
artificially reduces the bids of aviators whose quality scores exceed a threshold 
established by the Navy. This effect increases the probability of retaining high-quality 
aviators in comparison to those aviators who do not exceed quality thresholds and, 
consequently, receive no assistance in reducing the cost of their bids. The adjusted bids 
are ranked alongside all non-adjusted bids. The pre-announced number of winners is 
selected from the lowest bids. As with a simple uniform-price auction, all winning 
bidders are paid the amount requested in the first excluded bid. Those high-quality 
aviators selected for retention receive an additional sum equal to the amount their bids 
were discounted. 
Like other uniform-price auctions, QUAD auctions are also weakly dominant 
incentive compatible. Table 13 depicts the possible outcomes associated with the various 
bidding strategies of aviators receiving discounts to their bids. Here, as with the simple 
uniform-price auction, in no scenario can the bidder improve the outcome of the auction 
                                                 
32 QUAD is more general than the simple uniform-price auction because QUAD can accomplish 
everything that the simple uniform-price auction is able to accomplish and more. 
33 Note that Myung’s (2013) research on Surface Warfare Officer Retention found no positive 
correlation between quality and cost to retain. 
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by bidding other than the true reservation price. Bidding outcomes for aviators not 
receiving a quality adjustment are the same as the uniform-price auction (Table 11). 
 
 
Table 13.   QUAD Auction Bidding Strategy (after Myung, 2013) 
2. Model Description 
Aviators      are characterized by their bids     , reservation values       and a 
quality factor     . The objective of each aviator is to maximize their payoff     , in this 
case a cash bonus, by submitting a bid representative of their reservation value. The 
number of aviators participating in the auction is denoted by N. The Navy’s goal is to 
retain M of aviators. Additionally, the Navy is able to assign bid adjustments (X or Y) to 







. In this research, we focus on a simplified three-category model. In practice, 
the Navy has the flexibility to adjust the number of categories as desired. The adjusted 
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The sealed bids are collected and ranked from lowest to highest  {  }   
  . The M 
lowest bids are retained. For the purposes of our model, in the event that more than one 
aviator submits a bid of    
  the aviators with the highest quality scores will be retained to 
avoid exceeding retention goals. In the event of a tie in quality score, the tie is randomly 
broken. The cutoff bid is set to     
 , the first excluded bid. Aviators with   
      
  are 
selected for retention, paid a bonus, and incur the obligated service requirement. Bonuses 
are awarded as follows: 
 
 
Note that all retained aviators will receive at least as much as they have requested in their 
bids. Generally, the retained aviators will receive more than their bids submitted. In 
economics terminology, this is known as being individual rational.34 Aviators not 
selected receive no bonus, but are still eligible to remain in the aviation community. They 
may also separate from Active Duty or apply for a lateral transfer at the completion of 
their MSR. 
3. Example Auction 
Table 14 provides an example of a QUAD auction. To illustrate the difference 
between a simple uniform-price auction and the QUAD auction mechanisms, the bids and 
retention goals are the same as the example in Table 12. A four-point scale is used to 
                                                 
34 Individual rationality implies that the person has nothing to lose by participating in the process. 
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determine the quality of the bidders. Bids from aviators with     ≥ 4 are discounted by 
$40,000. Bids from aviators with 3 ≤    < 4 are discounted by $20,000. All other bids 
receive no adjustments. Factoring in these discounts, the bids are re-ranked and the cutoff 
bid is established at     
          . All retained aviators receive this bonus. Those 
with 3 ≤    < 4 receive an additional $20,000 and those with a     ≥ 4 receive an 
additional $40,000. Table 14 also highlights that, in comparison to a simple uniform-
price auction, using the QUAD mechanism resulted in a 60% increase in the average 
quality of retained aviators while the total cost to retain the required number of officers 











RANK RETAINED BONUS PAID
61,000$    1 2 -$                 61,000$       1                Yes 104,000$        
68,000$    2 1 -$                 68,000$       2                Yes 104,000$        
78,000$    3 2 -$                 78,000$       3                Yes 104,000$        
81,000$    4 2 -$                 81,000$       4                Yes 104,000$        
104,000$ 5 1 -$                 104,000$     9                No -$                 
104,000$ 6 3 (20,000)$        84,000$       5                Yes 124,000$        
106,000$ 7 3 (20,000)$        86,000$       6                Yes 124,000$        
129,000$ 8 1 -$                 129,000$     12              No -$                 
131,000$ 9 4 (40,000)$        91,000$       7                Yes 144,000$        
132,000$ 10 3 (20,000)$        112,000$     11              No -$                 
134,000$ 11 4 (40,000)$        94,000$       8                Yes 144,000$        
146,000$ 12 4 (40,000)$        106,000$     10              No -$                 
150,000$ 13 1 -$                 150,000$     13              No -$                 
165,000$ 14 2 -$                 165,000$     15              No -$                 
174,000$ 15 3 (20,000)$        154,000$     14              No -$                 
CUTOFF BID 104,000$     TOTAL COST 952,000$        
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C. COMBINATORIAL RETENTION AUCTION MECHANISM (CRAM) 
1. Introduction 
CRAM is also a more general form of the uniform-price auction. As explained by 
CGM (2013), CRAM is a reverse multi-unit auction. It seeks to elicit sellers’ reservation 
prices as not just cash value, but also a combination of non-monetary incentives (NMIs)35 
that the sellers may select in lieu of a specified cash amount. As with the simple uniform-
price auction, by employing CRAM the Navy can reduce the cost of retaining aviators 
while precisely meeting retention goals. Additionally, by offering NMIs CRAM has the 
potential to further reduce costs to the Navy by retaining individuals who receive greater 
utility from the NMIs than their simple monetary cost to the Navy. 
In practice, each aviator submits a bid for the cash bonus and any NMIs they 
would require in order to agree to an additional period of obligated service. The sealed 
bids are collected and each resultant combination of cash and NMIs is assigned a single 
cost parameter that serves as that seller’s bid. The preannounced quantity of offers is 
selected from the lowest costing bids. In keeping with the uniform-price auction format, 
the accepted offers receive a bonus equal to the cost of the first excluded bid. The actual 
composition of each bonus is the cash amount of the cutoff bid, plus the NMIs selected, 
less the value of those NMIs. Additionally, CRAM maintains the same weakly dominant 
incentives of a simple uniform-price auction (Table 11). 
2. Model Description 
Aviators      are characterized by their bids      and reservation values        The 
objective of each aviator is to maximize payoff     —in this case a combination of cash 
and NMIs—by submitting a bid representative of the reservation value. The number of 
aviators participating in the auction is denoted by N. The Navy’s goal is to retain M 
aviators. While the original CRAM allows for any number of NMIs, this model focuses 
on a simplified case of three NMIs, which are denoted as e, f, and g. Aviators may select 
any combination of these NMIs that increases the cost of bids by a predetermined amount 
                                                 
35 Examples of NMIs include choice of duty station, sabbaticals, and educational opportunities. For a 
more in-depth discussion on the potential of NMIs, refer to Coughlin, Gates, and Myung (2014). 
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denoted as   ,   , and   .36 Each aviator’s personal valuation of the NMIs offered is 
further denoted as   ,   , and   . The CRAM bids are calculated as follows: 
  
         𝑓       
Where e, f, g each = 1 if NMI is selected; 0 if NMI not selected 
The sealed bids are collected and ranked from lowest to highest  {  }   
  . The M 
lowest bids are retained. For purposes of our model, in the event that more than one 
aviator submits a bid of   
  the aviators with the lowest    will be retained. In the event of 
a tie in   , the tie will be randomly broken. The cutoff bid is set to     
 , the first 
excluded bid. Aviators with   
      
  are selected for retention, paid a bonus, and incur 
the obligated service requirement. Bonuses are awarded in two parts: monetary and non-
monetary: 
       
           𝑓                  
Where e, f, g each = 1 if selected; 0 if not selected 
As the equation for determining    illustrates, the CRAM is designed such that 
aviators seeking to maximize their payouts would only select an NMI when the value 
they derive from it exceeds the cost of selecting it. Moreover, the excess utility an aviator 
derives from an NMI (i.e., the difference between the value of the NMI and the cost of 
providing it) results in an overall reduction in the Navy’s cost to retain said aviator. 
Aviators not selected receive no bonus, but are still eligible to remain in the 
aviation community. They may also separate from Active Duty or apply for a lateral 
transfer at the completion of their MSR. 
3. Example Auction 
Table 15 provides a notional example of a CRAM. To illustrate the differences 
between a simple uniform-price auction and a CRAM, the same retention goal of eight 
out of 15 aviators is used. Additionally, the reservation prices are held to the same values 
                                                 
36 These values would be set at the Navy’s actual cost for providing the NMIs. 
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as the bids used in Table 12—reflecting a net change of zero in individual reservation 
values. The three available NMIs are e, f, and g, each with a cost of $10,000. Aviators 
selecting any combination of these NMIs have the associated costs added to their CRAM 
bid. No adjustments are made to the bids of aviators not selecting NMIs. Factoring in 
these adjustments, the resulting CRAM bids are re-ranked and the cutoff bid is 
established at     
          . Aviators with CRAM bids less than $107,000 are 
retained. Retained aviators receive the NMIs requested and $107,000 less the value of the 
requested NMIs. In this example, the excess utility aviators received from the NMIs 
resulted in reducing the total cost (cash plus the cost of the NMIs awarded) to retain eight 




Table 15.   CRAM Example and Comparison 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we discussed the three auction mechanisms used in our research: a 
simple uniform-price auction, a QUAD auction, and a CRAM. All employ a reverse 
second-price format. This encourages Naval Aviators to truthfully bid the bonus they 
would require in exchange for obligating to remain on Active Duty. These mechanisms 
were selected for their transparency, ease of use, and equitability. Perhaps most 
E F G E F G
1       61,000$              -$              40,000$          13,000$       8,000$            1 YES 87,000$       -$        10,000$       10,000$       
2       68,000$              -$              -$                -$              68,000$          3 YES 107,000$     -$        -$              -$              
3       78,000$              -$              -$                -$              78,000$          4 YES 107,000$     -$        -$              -$              
4       81,000$              -$              29,000$          -$              52,000$          2 YES 97,000$       -$        10,000$       -$              
5       104,000$           -$              -$                25,000$       79,000$          6 YES 97,000$       -$        -$              10,000$       
5       104,000$           27,000$        19,000$          -$              58,000$          4 YES 87,000$       10,000$  10,000$       -$              
7       106,000$           -$              -$                -$              106,000$        8 YES 107,000$     -$        -$              -$              
8       129,000$           -$              48,000$          -$              81,000$          7 YES 97,000$       -$        10,000$       -$              
9       131,000$           -$              -$                -$              131,000$        12 NO -$              -$        -$              -$              
10     132,000$           -$              35,000$          -$              97,000$          9 NO -$              -$        -$              -$              
11     134,000$           12,000$        13,000$          -$              109,000$        11 NO -$              -$        -$              -$              
12     146,000$           -$              -$                -$              146,000$        15 NO -$              -$        -$              -$              
13     150,000$           -$              24,000$          -$              126,000$        13 NO -$              -$        -$              -$              
14     165,000$           -$              44,000$          34,000$       87,000$          10 NO -$              -$        -$              -$              
15     174,000$           -$              45,000$          -$              129,000$        14 NO -$              -$        -$              -$              




E 25%  CASH 786,000$               CASH 1,048,000$ 
F 40% NMI COST 70,000$                NMI COST -
G 20% Total Cost 856,000$              Total Cost 1,048,000$ 
UNIFORM PRICE
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129,000$        
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importantly, however, these mechanisms each provide sufficient flexibility and precision 
to enable Force planners to accurately and more cost-effectively meet naval aviation 
retention objectives. In addition to these aspects, the QUAD mechanism, by providing 
preferential consideration to the bids of high-quality officers, enables the Navy to both 
control for the quality of aviators retained and reduce overall retention costs further. The 
CRAM offers potential for additional savings by retaining individuals who receive 




V. AVIATOR RETENTION SURVEY 
A. BACKGROUND 
A survey of Naval Aviators from Lieutenant (O-3) to Commander (O-5) was 
conducted to compare the results of the current ACCP program against the three auction 
mechanisms that were the focus of our research: Uniform-Price Auction, QUAD Auction, 
and CRAM. The survey data was used to establish both individual performance history 
and reservation price for agreeing to serve an additional term of service. Additionally, the 
value individuals associated with specific NMIs was also collected. These parameters 
were then used to simulate the projected retention rates and costs under the current ACCP 
system, as well as the auction mechanisms previously listed. 
B. SURVEY DEVELOPMENT AND DELIVERY 
Using LimeSurvey, an NPS approved open-source survey development and 
distribution program, we developed an online survey. We designed the questions to elicit 
the participants’ 1) quality, as a function of their performance history, to assess their 
value to the Navy, 2) reservation price for remaining on Active Duty to complete a DH 
tour and, 3) perceived value of several NMIs. Drafts of the survey were sent to several 
groups of Naval Aviators varying in rank and experience. Their inputs, along with those 
from Naval Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology (NPRST), were incorporated 
into the final version. 
Upon receiving approval from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) and Dean of Students, we sent an e-mail containing a link to the 
survey directly to NPS students (both on-site and distance learning) identified by the NPS 
Student Services Office as Naval Aviators (i.e., possessing a 1310 or 1320 designator). 
The survey was open to participants from April 28, 2014 to May 9, 2014. On May 4, 
2014, a reminder e-mail was sent to students who had not yet completed the survey. Each 
e-mail contained a unique token to ensure that only the students who had been e-mailed 
could complete the survey and that no duplicate submissions could be made. (See 
Appendix D for a copy of the survey.) 
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C. POPULATION AND SAMPLE STATISTICS 
Of the 341 Aviation Officers targeted, five students opted out of the survey and 
175 provided at least partial responses. Of the respondents, 24 failed to provide data by 
incompletely answering the questions used to determine reservation value. This brought 
the useable sample group to 142. Additionally, incomplete responses in the quality rating 
section further reduced the responses suitable for use in the QUAD model to 98. 
Table 16 provides a summary of the sample demographics and their comparison 
to the naval aviation population statics. We summarize individual communities into three 
general categories: fixed-wing carrier-based (FW CVN) (i.e., VAQ, VAW, VFA, VRC); 
fixed-wing land-based (FW Land) (i.e., VP, VQ(P), VQ(T)); and helicopter (HELO) (i.e., 
HM, HSC, HSM). 
 
 
Table 16.   Fleet and Survey Demographics Comparison 
D. ESTIMATION OF PARAMETERS 
1. Uniformed-Price Auction Bids 
To establish individual reservation values, a simple uniformed-price auction was 
briefly explained along with a hypothetical example of how the Navy might employ such 
an auction. We posed this question: “Assume you are in a group of 140 aviators eligible 
to receive a retention bonus. If, under the [uniform-price auction] system described 







FW CVN 55              36.9% 41%
FW Land 37              24.8% 28%
HELO 57              38.3% 31%
Pilot 100             69.0% 71%
NFO 45              31.0% 29%
Male 140             95.9% 94%
Female 6                4.1% 6%
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submit for your bid (total bonus amount)?”37 The respondents were able to select in 
$5,000 increments a value ranging from “$0/No Bonus Required” to “More than 
$175,000/Do not wish to be retained.”38 We further advised, “This value should be the 
MINIMUM amount you would be satisfied with in exchange for obligating to serve a DH 
tour.” Table 17 provides a summary of the responses provided by individual communities 
and the more generalized categories of FW CVN, FW Land, and HELO. Those 
respondents who selected “More than $175,000/Do not wish to be retained” were not 
included in determining the reservation price measures of central tendency. 
 
 
Table 17.   Reservation Price by Community 
                                                 
37 65 out of 140 aviators approximates the retention rate required to meet community DH requirements 
(ACCP PM, personal communication, 2014, March 19). 
38 The Navy is considering pursuing legislation to increase ACCP from a maximum of $25K/year to 
$35K/year which would equate to $175K for a five-year contract (CNO (MTP&E), unpublished power 










FW CVN 24                4                 20            100,000$ 100,000$ 100,000$ 51,348$   
VAQ 1                  -              1              25,000$   25,000$   N/A -$        
VAW 2                  -              2              75,000$   75,000$   N/A 35,355$   
VFA 19                4                 15            109,000$ 125,000$ 125,000$ 53,958$   
VRC 2                  -              2              100,000$ 100,000$ 100,000$ -$        
FW LAND 17                -              17            118,611$ 125,000$ 150,000$ 39,437$   
VP 13                -              13            117,308$ 125,000$ 150,000$ 43,235$   
VQ(P) 4                  -              4              100,000$ 100,000$ 100,000$ 63,738$   
VQ(T) -               -              -          -$        -$        -$        -$        
Helicopter 57                3                 54            99,167$   100,000$ 125,000$ 47,848$   
HM 3                  -              3              55,000$   75,000$   N/A -$        
HSC 32                1                 31            102,742$ 120,000$ 125,000$ 51,443$   
HSM 22                2                 20            100,250$ 100,000$ 75,000$   40,408$   
FW CVN 28                1                 27            80,741$   100,000$ 100,000$ 49,180$   
VAQ 11                -              11            93,636$   100,000$ 100,000$ 38,671$   
VAW 6                  1                 5              5,000$     -$        -$        11,801$   
VFA 11                -              11            102,273$ 100,000$ 75,000$   34,378$   
FW LAND 16                1                 15            76,000$   75,000$   125,000$ 40,848$   
VP 13                1                 12            82,692$   90,000$   75,000$   37,506$   
VQ(P) 1                  -              1              -$        -$        N/A -$        
VQ(T) 2                  -              2              82,500$   82,500$   N/A 24,749$   
ALL 142              9                 132          95,564$   100,000$ 125,000$ 47,529$   
PILOT 98                7                 91            103,187$ 100,000$ 125,000$ 47,507$   











2. QUAD Quality Scores 
Determining an Aviation Officer’s quality is ultimately a decision for policy-
makers. Using factors identified by NPC as affecting the likelihood of an individual being 
selected for DH, two methods for calculating an aviator’s quality rating were explored. 
Both methods use the same general categories, but vary in some of the specific metrics 
used and the weights assigned to them. We used the following categories to determine: 
 Final FITREP ranking during first sea tour 
 First shore tour assignment 
 Final FITREP ranking during first shore tour 
 An “Other Factors” category comprised of specific qualifications and 
experiences 
Additional factors considered for determining quality ratings included subsequent 
assignment’s (e.g., second sea tour, DH tour) and their associated FITREP rankings. 
These metrics were listed as “Not Applicable” by 32 of the 98 respondents who did 
provide sufficient data for the first two quality methods. Without an effective method for 
normalizing the responses of those 32 respondents, we determined that these factors, 
though relevant, would not be included in assigning quality ratings. 
a. Quality Method I 
Table 18 illustrates the four categories that were used to determine an individual’s 
quality ranking and the weights assigned to the possible responses. With the exception of 
the “other factors” category, only a single value may be provided. To determine an 
individual’s quality score, the values from each category are summed. This results in 




Table 18.   Quality Method I Scale 
b. Quality Method II 
Table 19 illustrates the four categories we used to determine an individual’s 
quality ranking and the weights assigned to the possible responses. In addition to the 
factors used in the first method, metrics that have been shown to have a negative 
correlation in DH selection rates have been included. Using aggregate DH selection rate 
data from 2010 to 2013, we assigned these metrics as having greater significance when 
they had been shown to be more highly correlated with DH selection rates. As an 
example: an individual qualified as a WTI was on average 26.7% more likely to be 
selected for DH than an individual not possessing that qualification. Thus, that individual 
was assigned 2.5 points. Conversely, individuals who had been assigned to fill Individual 
Augment requirements were historically 14.5% less likely to be selected for DH than 
individuals who had not and, therefore, had 1.5 points deducted from their scores. We 
applied this logic to all the performance metrics used in Method II. Here again, only a 
single value may be assigned to each category—with the exception of the “other factors” 
category. To determine an individual’s quality score, we summed the values from each 








#1 EP 4 #1 EP 4
Other EP 3 Other EP 3
NOB 2 NOB 2
#1 MP 1 #1 MP 1














Table 19.   Quality Method II Scale 
c. Quality Method Scores and Comparison 
Table 20 summarizes the results of the two quality rating systems. Despite the 
different scores resulting from each method, when applied to the same sample group the 
resultant correlation between the two methods was .961. Under the quality rating metrics 
used, aviators would have generally been afforded the same opportunities and competed 
against only members of their own community. Accordingly, the varying aggregate 
community quality scores should not be interpreted as an indicator of some disparate 







#1 EP 4.5 #1 EP 4.5
Other EP 3.5 Other EP 3.5
NOB 2.5 NOB 2.5
#1 MP 2 #1 MP 2
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Table 20.   Quality Score by Community 
d. Relating Reservation Price to Quality Score 
Using the second quality method, we compared individual aviator’s quality 
ratings against their reservation price using linear regression.39 Table 21 summarizes the 
results for any category that had at least eight valid observations. As an example: using 
the data set for all valid observations (i.e., “ALL”), a simple correlation of individual 
quality scores and their corresponding reservation prices reveals a correlation of -.054. 
The linear expression that best describes the relationship between quality score and 
reservation price suggests that an aviator with a quality rating of zero would have a 
reservation price of $99,719. Further, this reservation price would decrease by $862 for 
                                                 
39 Aviators who responded “More than $175,000/Do not wish to be retained” were not included in 




















ALL 98            8.00      2.94     2.00     14.00   8.00      3.28     1.50     14.00   
PILOT 63            8.00      2.75     3.00     13.00   7.50      3.10     2.00     14.00   
NFO 35            8.00      3.20     2.00     14.00   9.50      3.46     2.00     14.00   
FW CVN 16            9.00      2.87     4.00     13.00   10.25    3.30     3.00     14.00   
VAQ 1              10.00    -       10.00   10.00   11.50    - 11.50   11.50   
VAW 1              9.00      -       9.00     9.00     10.50    -       10.50   10.50   
VFA 12            9.50      2.86     4.00     13.00   10.25    3.54     3.00     14.00   
VRC 2              6.00      -       6.00     6.00     6.25      0.35     6.00     6.50     
FW LAND 13            6.00      2.54     3.00     11.00   6.00      2.69     2.50     10.50   
VP 10            6.00      2.85     3.00     11.00   5.75      2.99     2.50     10.50   
VQ(P) 3              6.00      1.53     5.00     8.00     6.00      1.76     4.50     8.00     
VQ(T) -           -        -       -       -       -        -       -       -       
HELO 34            7.00      2.62     3.00     12.00   7.25      2.86     2.50     13.00   
HM - - - - - - - - -
HSC 22            8.00      2.41     3.00     12.00   8.00      2.75     2.50     13.00   
HSM 12            6.00      3.03     3.00     12.00   6.50      3.16     2.50     13.00   
FW CVN 23            9.00      2.89     4.00     14.00   9.50      3.02     4.50     14.00   
VAQ 10            8.50      3.39     4.00     13.00   9.25      3.54     4.50     14.00   
VAW 5              11.00    3.29     7.00     14.00   11.50    4.02     5.00     14.00   
VFA 8              8.50      1.69     8.00     12.00   10.00    1.43     8.00     12.50   
FW LAND 12            7.50      3.45     2.00     13.00   6.50      3.36     1.50     14.00   
VP 9              6.00      3.66     2.00     13.00   6.50      4.26     1.50     14.00   
VQ(P) 1              12.00    - 12.00   12.00   13.00    - 13.00   13.00   













Quality Method I Quality Method II
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every one-point increase in quality rating. An R-squared value of .003 reveals that this 
relationship explains only 0.3% of variation from the mean. This is in keeping with 
previous research on service member quality scores and reservation price (Nowell, 2012). 
As Table 21 depicts, though multiple communities suggest a positive relationship 
between quality score and reservation price, the coefficient p-values reveal that none of 
these models, even the community with the lowest p-value (VFA pilots), is not 
statistically significant above a threshold of 16%. (See Appendix E for the residual plots 
of quality score and reservation price.) 
 
 
Table 21.   Relationship between Quality Score (Method II) and Reservation Price 









ALL 91                    -0.054 0.003    $99,719 0.000 -$862 0.609
PILOT 57                    0.097 0.009    $89,925 0.000 $1,669 0.472
NFO 34                    -0.152 0.023    $94,090 0.000 -$2,067 0.379
FW CVN 13                    0.328 0.108    $39,092 0.486 $6,473 0.273
VAQ -                  - - - - - -
VAW -                  - - - - - -
VFA 9                      0.501 0.251    $7,186 0.919 $10,472 0.169
VRC -                  - -        - - - -
FW LAND 13                    -0.006 0.000    $119,773 0.002 -$91 0.984
VP 10                    0.100 0.010    $109,244 0.010 $1,399 0.784
VQ(P) -                  - - - - - -
VQ(T) -                  - - - - - -
HELO 31                    0.147 0.022    $75,875 0.014 $2,748 0.429
HM -                  - - - - - -
HSC 21                    0.094 0.009    $83,576 0.052 $1,941 0.687
HSM 10                    0.253 0.064    $64,800 0.038 $3,847 0.920
FW CVN 23                    -0.113 0.013    $91,482 0.002 -$1,790 0.352
VAQ 10                    -0.037 0.001    $96,800 0.038 -$422 0.920
VAW -                  - - - - - -
VFA 8                      0.265 0.070    $45,326 0.555 $4,783 0.526
FW LAND 11                    -0.214 0.046    $96,543 0.080 -$2,384 0.833
VP 8                      0.038 0.002    $81,880 0.272 $399 0.601
VQ(P) -                  - - - - - -















3. CRAM Bids 
To determine how NMIs might affect individual bids, we asked survey 
participants a series of questions relating to two specific NMIs: 1) Guaranteed DH duty 
station location of choice and 2) the opportunity to attend an in-residence graduate degree 
program. 
a. NMI I: Duty Station of Choice 
To establish the value participants placed on duty station location, our first survey 
first posed the statement: “Please specify the location you would prefer to be stationed for 
your ‘Department Head Tour.’ Possible responses were 1) Not Applicable, 2) CONUS 
Central, 3) CONUS East Coast, 4) CONUS West Coast, and 5) OCONUS. We then asked 
respondents, “What is the equivalent cash bonus you would be willing to forgo for the 
guarantee of serving in your preferred duty station?” 
Of the 141 useable responses, 132 provided a preference for a duty station 
location. Of those 132 with a preference, 70 were willing to forgo some cash amount in 
exchange for the guarantee of serving in their preferred duty station. Table 22 provides a 
summary of these respondents and the value they placed on this NMI. For instance, in the 
ALL category of the 141 Aviators who answered this portion of the survey 70, or 49.6%, 
would be willing to forgo a portion of a cash bonus for the guarantee of their choice of 
duty station. The mean and median values these 70 individuals were willing to forego for 




Table 22.   Summary of Value of NMI I: Duty Station of Choice 
b. NMI II: In-residence Graduate Education 
To establish the value participants placed on an NMI that provided an in-
residence graduate education opportunity, our survey posed the following situation: 
Suppose as part of the “Aviation Bonus” there was the option to attend an in-
residence degree program in lieu of some other “due-course” career path option 
(e.g., shortening or foregoing a “Disassociated Sea Tour” to attend the Naval 
Postgraduate School). Assume that in addition to a cash bonus you were offered 
this option. How interested would you be in the in-residence degree portion of the 
bonus? 
Community  Observations 
 Value NMI  
> $ 0 
 % Who 
Value NMI  
> $ 0 




 Std. Dev (1) 
ALL 141                  70               49.6% 41,500$        25,000$        41,888$        
PILOT 98                    55               56.1% 38,182$        25,000$        33,807$        
NFO 43                    15               34.9% 53,667$        25,000$        63,540$        
FW CVN 24                    10               41.7% 33,500$        22,500$        29,255$        
VAQ 1                      1                 100.0% 10,000$        10,000$        -$              
VAW 2                      2                 100.0% 30,000$        30,000$        28,284$        
VFA 19                    6                 31.6% 40,833$        37,500$        34,120$        
VRC 2                      1                 50.0% 20,000$        20,000$        -$              
FW LAND 17                    10               58.8% 38,500$        22,500$        41,302$        
VP 13                    7                 53.8% 30,714$        10,000$        33,964$        
VQ(P) 4                      3                 75.0% 56,667$        25,000$        59,231$        
VQ(T) - -              - -$              -$              -$              
HELO 57                    35               61.4% 39,429$        25,000$        33,602$        
HM 3                      2                 66.7% 47,500$        47,500$        38,891$        
HSC 32                    18               56.3% 43,056$        35,000$        28,756$        
HSM 22                    15               68.2% 34,000$        20,000$        39,650$        
FW CVN 28                    10               35.7% 35,000$        25,000$        26,562$        
VAQ 11                    7                 63.6% 39,286$        30,000$        31,415$        
VAW 6                      -              0.0% -$              -$              -$              
VFA 11                    3                 27.3% 25,000$        25,000$        -$              
FW LAND 15                    5                 33.3% 91,000$        50,000$        99,649$        
VP 12                    5                 41.7% 91,000$        50,000$        99,649$        
VQ(P) 1                      -              0.0% -$              -$              -$              
VQ(T) 2                      -              0.0% -$              -$              -$              













(1) For Avaitors valuing NMI above $0.00
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Possible responses were 1) Not at all interested, 2) Indifferent/Don’t Know, 3) 
Somewhat Interested, 4) Very Interested, and 5) Extremely Interested. Table 23 provides 
a summary of the 141 useable responses. 
 
 
Table 23.   Interest in NMI II: In-residence Graduate Education 
Survey participants were then asked, “What is the equivalent cash bonus you 
would be willing to forgo for the guarantee of attending a Naval Aviation Enterprise 
(NAE) supported in-residence degree program like the one described?” 
Table 24 provides a summary of the value participants placed on this NMI. As an 
example, of the 141 responses in the ALL category 82, or 58.2%, were willing to forgo 
some cash amount in exchange for the guarantee of attending an in-residence graduate 
education program. The mean and median values these 82 individuals were willing to 




























Table 24.   Summary of Value of NMI II: In-residence Graduate Education 
  
Community  Observations 
 Value NMI  
> $ 0 
 % Who 
Value NMI  
> $ 0 




 Std. Dev (1) 
ALL 141                82               58.2% 46,378$      30,000$      37,637$      
PILOT 98                  58               59.2% 48,897$      35,000$      39,418$      
NFO 43                  24               55.8% 40,292$      30,000$      32,913$      
FW CVN 24                  14               58.3% 47,500$      37,500$      36,977$      
VAQ 1                    1                 100.0% 10,000$      10,000$      -$            
VAW 2                    1                 50.0% 35,000$      35,000$      -$            
VFA 19                  10               52.6% 57,000$      50,000$      37,874$      
VRC 2                    1                 50.0% 15,000$      15,000$      -$            
FW LAND 17                  11               64.7% 60,909$      50,000$      47,530$      
VP 13                  10               76.9% 54,500$      50,000$      44,811$      
VQ(P) 4                    1                 25.0% 25,000$      25,000$      -$            
VQ(T) - - - - - -
HELO 57                  24               42.1% 44,417$      30,000$      39,031$      
HM 3                    1                 33.3% 15,000$      15,000$      -$            
HSC 32                  4                 12.5% 67,500$      50,000$      56,789$      
HSM 22                  15               68.2% 41,067$      25,000$      39,315$      
FW CVN 28                  16               57.1% 40,063$      40,000$      29,122$      
VAQ 11                  9                 81.8% 49,000$      50,000$      34,355$      
VAW 6                    1                 16.7% 50,000$      50,000$      -$            
VFA 11                  6                 54.5% 25,000$      25,000$      14,832$      
FW LAND 15                  8                 53.3% 40,750$      27,500$      41,733$      
VP 12                  7                 58.3% 46,429$      30,000$      41,605$      
VQ(P) 1                    -              0.0% -$            -$            -$            














(1) For Avaitors valuing NMI above $0.00
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VI. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
To analyze the effects of implementing an auction-based retention system, we 
input the data and quality scores derived from the survey into five models using 
Microsoft Excel. To facilitate a comparison of these models, we used only the 98 
responses that could be used in every model. The first model represents a simple 
uniform-price auction. The second and third models both simulated a QUAD auction, but 
varied in the quality level required to receive a discount.40 The fourth and fifth models 
both simulated CRAMs: the fourth using NMI I (duty station location) and the fifth using 
NMI II (in-residence graduate school).41 We conducted Iterations of each model for 
communities containing at least eight valid observations. Additionally, we conducted 
simulations using the general categories of FW CVN, FW Land, and Helo, as well as the 
aggregate data sets of all aviators, pilots, and NFOs. We used the results of each 
simulation to determine the estimated retention costs and quality scores associated with 
the different auction mechanisms. We evaluated these values against the results of the 
current system to determine potential cost savings and the impact on the aggregate 
quality of retained aviators. 
B. GENERAL ANALYSIS 
To determine the retention requirements and overall performance of the auction 
models, we used the most recently completed ACCP Program (FY-2013) as a baseline. 
Table 25 depicts the population sizes and retention requirements of the FY-2013 ACCP 
Program. Using these parameters, we determined the equivalent retention goals of the 
sample population. For instance, in FY-2013 there were 137 VFA pilots eligible to 
receive the bonus. Of the 137, the Navy sought to retain 62 for a desired retention rate of 
                                                 
40 Because of the correlation of .961 between the two quality-scoring methods, we only used Method 
II in this analysis. 
41 Because of the survey’s failure to address the sub-additive and super-additive possibilities of 
offering multiple NMIs, we did not analyze the potential results of bidders being able to select both NMIs 
simultaneously. 
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45%. When we applied this rate to the corresponding sample population, each model 
retained five of the 12 VFA Pilot bids (i.e., observations).42 
 
 
Table 25.   FY-2013 ACCP Parameters and Retention Goals with Corresponding 
Sample Population Requirements 
It should be noted that the categories not associated with a specific community 
(e.g., FW CVN Pilot, All NFOs), while commonly used to measure ACCP performance, 
do not necessarily account for individual community retention requirements. Therefore, 
they may not accurately reflect the true costs of meeting Navy retention goals. As such, 
we did not use these categories for analytical purposes. We provide them only as a 
reference. Additionally, due to the limited data for some communities it is not possible to 
estimate the expected costs and resultant quality levels associated with meeting every 
                                                 
42 Because these auction mechanisms allow the flexibility to retain exactly the desired number of 
bidders, we assumed that retention goals were met any time there were sufficient aviators willing to be 


















ALL 971     331          34% 98          34% 33              
PILOT 649     238          37% 63          37% 23              
NFO 322     93            29% 35          29% 10              
FW CVN 201     91            45% 16          45% 7                
VFA 137     62            45% 12          45% 5                
FW LAND 161     45            28% 13          28% 4                
VP 125     31            25% 10          25% 3                
HELO 287     102          36% 34          36% 12              
HSC 133     48            36% 22          36% 8                
HSM 138     48            35% 12          35% 4                
FW CVN 174     49            28% 24          28% 7                
VAQ 49       17            35% 10          35% 4                
VFA 56       14            25% 8            25% 2                
FW LAND 148     44            30% 11          30% 3                
VP 107     28            26% 8            26% 2                














community’s retention goal without making additional assumptions. The category 
“Aggregate Retention,” which accounts for the individual retention requirements of seven 
of the 15 different communities recognized under ACCP, is used to give some estimation 
of each model’s overall effects on ACCP. 
C. UNIFORM-PRICE AUCTION  
1. Analysis 
The uniform-price model ranks each bidder in ascending order from the 
appropriate data set according to the amount each provided in the survey. Using the 
retention goals listed in Table 25, the corresponding number of bidders beginning with 
the lowest reservation prices are assumed to be retained. Where reservation prices were 
the same, the bidders with higher quality scores (using method II) were retained. The cost 
to retain the selected aviators was set at the first excluded bid (i.e., the cut-off bid). See 
Appendix F for the residual plots of this model. To obtain the equivalent cost of 
implementing a uniform-price auction, the cut-off bid as determined by the model was 
multiplied by the actual retention goals of the FY-2013 program. 
2. Results 
Table 26 lists the cut-off bids and resultant costs in comparison to the actual 
results of the FY 2013 program. As an example, the HSM community had a cut-off bid of 
$75,000—which coincidentally equaled the bonus amount offered in FY-2013—
however, by limiting retention to the desired retention goal of 48 aviators, the uniform 
price auction resulted in an equivalent cost of $3,600,000. When this is compared to the 
$5,850,000 spent on retaining HSM pilots in FY-2013, the savings are $2,250,000 or a 




Table 26.   Cost Analysis of Uniform-Price Auction Model 
Under the uniform-price auction mechanism the HSM and VP NFO communities, 
which over-retained aviators under the current method, realized a cost-savings. Because 
of the bidders’ high reservation prices, the HSC community was the only community that 
retained fewer aviators, but it did not yield a cost savings. The increased costs under the 
uniform-price mechanism for the remaining communities can be attributed to the 
additional costs associated with meeting retention goals. As a result, the Aggregate 
Retention costs associated with meeting retention goals was 13.5% above what the Navy 
spent in FY-2013 on retaining these communities. Despite these increases in cost, all 
community-specific categories were able to meet retention goals while maintaining bonus 
payouts at or below congressionally mandated maximums. Moreover, when correcting 
the total amount spent on Aggregate Retention for over-retention, the cost per aviator 








 Actual Cost  Cut-off Bid 
 Equivalent 
Cost 
 Total Cost Δ 
% Total 
Cost Δ
ALL 331          - 351          28,775,000$   85,000$     28,135,000$   -$640,000 -2.2%
PILOT 238          - 243          20,600,000$   100,000$   23,800,000$   $3,200,000 15.5%
NFO 93            - 108          8,175,000$     50,000$     4,650,000$     -$3,525,000 -43.1%
FW CVN 91            - 67            7,975,000$     110,000$   10,010,000$   $2,035,000 25.5%
VFA 62            125,000$   47            5,875,000$     125,000$   7,750,000$     $1,875,000 31.9%
FW LAND 45            - 33            1,900,000$     100,000$   4,500,000$     $2,600,000 136.8%
VP 31            50,000$     23            1,150,000$     125,000$   3,875,000$     $2,725,000 237.0%
HELO 102          - 143          10,725,000$   85,000$     8,670,000$     -$2,055,000 -19.2%
HSC 48            75,000$     58            4,350,000$     100,000$   4,800,000$     $450,000 10.3%
HSM 48            75,000$     78            5,850,000$     75,000$     3,600,000$     -$2,250,000 -38.5%
FW CVN 49            - 55            4,250,000$     50,000$     2,450,000$     -$1,800,000 -42.4%
VAQ 17            100,000$   15            1,500,000$     100,000$   1,700,000$     $200,000 13.3%
VFA 14            25,000$     5              125,000$        75,000$     1,050,000$     $925,000 740.0%
FW LAND 44            - 53            3,925,000$     65,000$     2,860,000$     -$1,065,000 -27.1%
VP 28            75,000$     41            3,075,000$     75,000$     2,100,000$     -$975,000 -31.7%
248          - 267          21,925,000$   - 24,875,000$   2,950,000$   13.5%




Note: Shaded values do not take into account community-specific retention requirements














Current Method (FY 2013)
Total Cost/Aviator Total Cost/Aviator
102,934$                            100,302$                              
Corrected for Over-Retention1
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D. QUAD AUCTION MODEL I 
1. Analysis 
Under this model, a discount of $25,000 was applied to the bids of aviators whose 
quality scores ranked in the top 10% of their category. Similar to the simple uniform-
price model, these adjusted bids were then ranked in ascending order. Using the 
equivalent retention goal from Table 25, the model then selected the appropriate number 
of aviators to be retained. Where reservation prices were the same, the bidders with the 
highest quality score were retained. The cost to retain the selected aviators was set at the 
first excluded bid (i.e., the cut-off bid). To obtain the equivalent cost of implementing 
this QUAD auction mechanism the cut-off bid, along with any additional cash payments 
to high-quality aviators, was compiled into an average cost per individual retained. This 
value was multiplied by the actual retention goals of the FY-2013 program. To access the 
change in the quality of the retained bidders, we compared the mean quality scores from 
each category against the mean scores of the aviators retained under the uniform-price 
auction. 
2. Results 
a. Overall Cost 
Table 27 lists the resulting costs of implementing a series of QUAD auctions with 
the previously stated parameters and compares these results against the actual costs for 
the FY-2013 program. As an example, the HSM community had a cut-off bid of $70,000; 
however, when accounting for the additional bonuses paid to high-quality aviators, the 
mean cost of retaining an individual was $81,250. This is more than the bonus offered 
under the current method. Nevertheless, by limiting retention to the desired retention goal 
of 48 aviators, this QUAD auction resulted in an equivalent cost of $3,900,000 for a 
savings of $1,950,000, or a 33.3% reduction when compared to the FY-2013 program’s 




Table 27.   Cost Analysis of QUAD Auction Model I 
Under this QUAD auction mechanism, the HSM and VP NFO communities, 
which over-retained aviators under the current method, realized a cost-savings. Because 
of the bidders’ high reservation prices, the HSC community was the only community that 
retained fewer aviators, but it did not result in a cost savings. The increased costs under 
this QUAD auction mechanism for the remaining communities can be attributed to the 
additional costs associated with actually meeting retention goals. As a result, the 
Aggregate Retention costs associated with meeting retention goals was 9.6% above what 
the Navy spent in FY-2013 on retaining these communities. Despite these increases in 
cost, all community-specific categories were able to meet retention goals while 
maintaining bonus payouts at or below congressionally mandated maximums. Moreover, 
when correcting the total amount spent on Aggregate Retention for over-retention, the 














 Total Cost Δ 
% Total 
Cost Δ
ALL 331           - 351          28,775,000$   80,000$     84,545$     27,984,395$   -$790,605 -2.7%
PILOT 238           - 243          20,600,000$   100,000$   104,348$   24,834,824$   $4,234,824 20.6%
NFO 93             - 108          8,175,000$     50,000$     55,000$     5,115,000$     -$3,060,000 -37.4%
FW CVN 91             - 67            7,975,000$     100,000$   103,571$   9,424,961$     $1,449,961 18.2%
VFA 62             125,000$   47            5,875,000$     110,000$   115,000$   7,130,000$     $1,255,000 21.4%
FW LAND 45             - 33            1,900,000$     100,000$   106,250$   4,781,250$     $2,881,250 151.6%
VP 31             50,000$     23            1,150,000$     100,000$   100,000$   3,100,000$     $1,950,000 169.6%
HELO 102           - 143          10,725,000$   85,000$     89,167$     9,095,034$     -$1,629,966 -15.2%
HSC 48             75,000$     58            4,350,000$     100,000$   103,125$   4,950,000$     $600,000 13.8%
HSM 48             75,000$     78            5,850,000$     75,000$     81,250$     3,900,000$     -$1,950,000 -33.3%
FW CVN 49             - 55            4,250,000$     50,000$     54,286$     2,660,014$     -$1,589,986 -37.4%
VAQ 17             100,000$   15            1,500,000$     100,000$   106,250$   1,806,250$     $306,250 20.4%
VFA 14             25,000$     5              125,000$        75,000$     75,000$     1,050,000$     $925,000 740.0%
FW LAND 44             - 53            3,925,000$     65,000$     65,000$     2,860,000$     -$1,065,000 -27.1%
VP 28             75,000$     41            3,075,000$     75,000$     75,000$     2,100,000$     -$975,000 -31.7%
248           - 267          21,925,000$   - 96,920$     24,036,250$   $2,111,250 9.6%
 Cost Δ %  Δ
-$6,014 -5.8%
Note: Shaded values do not take into account community-specific retention requirements
1 Includes data from the following communities:  Pilot: VFA, VP, HSC, HSM.  NFO: VAQ, VFA, VP.
















102,934$                            
Total Cost/Aviator




b. Quality  
Table 28 lists the average quality score of aviators retained under both the 
uniform-price model and QUAD Model I, as well as the differences in cost incurred by 
each model. In no case did using QUAD Model I result in a decrease in the quality of 
aviators retained. Further, in the case of VAQ NFOs quality was increased. Additionally, 
the equivalent total costs for the VFA and VP pilot communities were lower under this 
QUAD model. Furthermore, the Aggregate Retention category resulted in both an overall 




Table 28.   Uniform-Price and QUAD Model I Cost and Quality Comparison 
E. QUAD AUCTION MODEL II 
1. Analysis 
To explore the implications of offering quality discounts to a broader set of 








 Total Cost Δ 




 Qlty Score 
Δ 
ALL 28,135,000$      8.44          27,984,395$      -$150,605 -0.5% 8.62          0.18          
PILOT 23,800,000$      7.77          24,834,824$      $1,034,824 4.3% 8.33          0.56          
NFO 4,650,000$        10.40        5,115,000$        $465,000 10.0% 10.40        -            
FW CVN 10,010,000$      8.36          9,424,961$        -$585,039 -5.8% 9.50          1.14          
VFA 7,750,000$        9.40          7,130,000$        -$620,000 -8.0% 9.40          -            
FW LAND 4,500,000$        6.50          4,781,250$        $281,250 6.3% 7.13          0.63          
VP 3,875,000$        6.00          3,100,000$        -$775,000 -20.0% 6.00          -            
HELO 8,670,000$        7.88          9,095,034$        $425,034 4.9% 7.88          -            
HSC 4,800,000$        8.06          4,950,000$        $150,000 3.1% 8.06          -            
HSM 3,600,000$        8.00          3,900,000$        $300,000 8.3% 8.00          -            
FW CVN 2,450,000$        10.71        2,660,014$        $210,014 8.6% 10.71        -            
VAQ 1,700,000$        8.88          1,806,250$        $106,250 6.3% 11.00        2.12          
VFA 1,050,000$        10.00        1,050,000$        $0 0.0% 10.00        -            
FW LAND 2,860,000$        9.67          2,860,000$        $0 0.0% 9.67          -            
VP 2,100,000$        8.00          2,100,000$        $0 0.0% 8.00          -            
24,875,000$      8.37          24,036,250$      -$838,750 -3.4% 8.64          0.27          
Aggregate 
Retention1,2








1 Includes data from the following communities:  Pilot: VFA, VP, HSC, HSM.  NFO: VAQ, VFA, VP.









quality scores ranked in the top 25% of their category. Similar to the uniform-price 
model, these adjusted bids were then ranked in ascending order. Using the equivalent 
retention goal from Table 25, the appropriate number of aviators was selected for 
retention. Where reservation prices were the same, the bidders with the highest quality 
scores were retained. The cost to retain the selected aviators was set at the first excluded 
bid. To obtain the equivalent cost of implementing this QUAD auction mechanism, the 
cut-off bid, along with any additional cash payments to high-quality aviators, was 
compiled into an average cost per individual retained. This value was multiplied by the 
actual retention goals of the FY-2013 program. To access the change in the quality of the 
retained bidders, we compared the mean quality scores from each category against the 
mean scores of the aviators retained under the uniform-price auction. 
2. Results 
a. Overall Cost 
Table 29 lists the resulting costs of implementing this series of QUAD auctions 
and compares them against the actual costs for the FY-2013 program. As an example, the 
HSM community had a cut-off bid of $50,000; however, when accounting for the 
additional bonuses paid to high-quality aviators the mean cost of retaining an individual 
was $87,500. This was larger than the bonus amount offered in FY-2013. Still, by 
limiting retention to the desired retention goal of 48 aviators, this QUAD auction resulted 
in an equivalent cost of $4,200,000 for a savings of $1,650,000, or a 28.2% reduction 





Table 29.   Cost Analysis of QUAD Auction Model II 
Under this QUAD auction mechanism, the HSM and VP NFO communities, 
which over-retained aviators under the current method, realized a cost-savings. Because 
of the bidders’ high reservation prices, the HSC community was the only community that 
retained fewer aviators, but it did not result in a cost savings. The increased costs under 
this QUAD auction mechanism for the remaining communities can be attributed to the 
additional costs associated with actually meeting retention goals. As a result, the 
Aggregate Retention costs associated with meeting retention goals was 12.5% above 
what the Navy spent in FY-2013 on retaining these communities. All community-specific 
categories were able to meet retention goals; however, bonus payment to high-quality 
VFA pilots exceeded congressionally mandated maximums by $35,000. Nevertheless, 
when correcting the total amount spent on Aggregate Retention for over-retention, the 















 Total Cost Δ 
% Total 
Cost Δ
ALL 331           - 351          28,775,000$    60,000$     88,788$     29,388,828$    $613,828 2.1%
PILOT 238           - 243          20,600,000$    100,000$   119,565$   28,456,470$    $7,856,470 38.1%
NFO 93             - 108          8,175,000$      50,000$     70,000$     6,510,000$      -$1,665,000 -20.4%
FW CVN 91             - 67            7,975,000$      100,000$   121,429$   11,050,039$    $3,075,039 38.6%
VFA 62             125,000$   47            5,875,000$      110,000$   130,000$   8,060,000$      $2,185,000 37.2%
FW LAND 45             - 33            1,900,000$      75,000$     100,000$   4,500,000$      $2,600,000 136.8%
VP 31             50,000$     23            1,150,000$      75,000$     91,667$     2,841,677$      $1,691,677 147.1%
HELO 102           - 143          10,725,000$    75,000$     100,000$   10,200,000$    -$525,000 -4.9%
HSC 48             75,000$     58            4,350,000$      85,000$     103,750$   4,980,000$      $630,000 14.5%
HSM 48             75,000$     78            5,850,000$      50,000$     87,500$     4,200,000$      -$1,650,000 -28.2%
FW CVN 49             - 55            4,250,000$      50,000$     71,429$     3,500,021$      -$749,979 -17.6%
VAQ 17             100,000$   15            1,500,000$      80,000$     105,000$   1,785,000$      $285,000 19.0%
VFA 14             25,000$     5              125,000$         75,000$     100,000$   1,400,000$      $1,275,000 1020.0%
FW LAND 44             - 53            3,925,000$      50,000$     66,667$     2,933,348$      -$991,652 -25.3%
VP 28             75,000$     41            3,075,000$      50,000$     50,000$     1,400,000$      -$1,675,000 -54.5%
248           - 267          21,925,000$    - 99,462$     24,666,677$    2,741,677$   12.5%
 Cost Δ %  Δ
-$3,472 -3.4%
1 Includes data from the following communities:  Pilot: VFA, VP, HSC, HSM.  NFO: VAQ, VFA, VP.
Corrected for Over-Retention
1
Total Cost/Aviator Total Cost/Aviator
102,934$                            99,462$                          
Note: Shaded categories do not take into account community-specific retention requirements

















Table 30 lists the average quality score of aviators retained under both the 
uniform-price model and QUAD Model II as well as the differences in cost incurred by 
each model. Using this model, average quality scores improved over the uniform-price 
model for every community-specific category, except for VP NFO, which remained the 
same. Equivalent total costs, however, increased for every community-specific category 
with the exception of VP pilot. Furthermore, the Aggregate Retention category saw both 
an increase in cost and quality score in comparison to the uniform-price model. 
 
 
Table 30.   Uniform-Price and QUAD Model II Cost and Quality Comparison 
F. CRAM MODEL USING NMI I 
1. Analysis 
Under this model, choice of duty station during one’s DH tour was offered as an 
NMI. All aviators who in the survey stated a valuation of more than $15,000 for the 








 Total Cost Δ 




 Qlty Score 
Δ 
ALL 28,135,000$      8.44          28,837,051$      $702,051 2.5% 9.70          1.26          
PILOT 23,800,000$      7.96          26,128,354$      $2,328,354 9.8% 8.35          0.39          
NFO 4,650,000$        10.40        5,580,000$        $930,000 20.0% 10.40        -            
FW CVN 10,010,000$      8.36          9,750,013$        -$259,987 -2.6% 10.43        2.07          
VFA 7,750,000$        9.40          8,060,000$        $310,000 4.0% 10.20        0.80          
FW LAND 4,500,000$        6.50          5,062,500$        $562,500 12.5% 6.50          -            
VP 3,875,000$        6.00          3,100,000$        -$775,000 -20.0% 6.83          0.83          
HELO 8,670,000$        7.88          8,712,534$        $42,534 0.5% 8.67          0.79          
HSC 4,800,000$        8.06          5,100,000$        $300,000 6.3% 8.81          0.75          
HSM 3,600,000$        8.00          4,200,000$        $600,000 16.7% 9.88          1.88          
FW CVN 2,450,000$        10.71        2,974,986$        $524,986 21.4% 10.71        -            
VAQ 1,700,000$        8.88          1,806,250$        $106,250 6.3% 12.50        3.62          
VFA 1,050,000$        10.00        1,166,662$        $116,662 11.1% 11.50        1.50          
FW LAND 2,860,000$        9.67          3,226,652$        $366,652 12.8% 9.67          -            
VP 2,100,000$        8.00          2,333,324$        $233,324 11.1% 8.00          -            










Note: Shaded values do not take into account community-specific retention requirements
1 Includes data from the following communities:  Pilot: VFA, VP, HSC, HSM.  NFO: VAQ, VFA, VP.
2 Quality related data is calculated using weighted averages.







$15,000 assumed to be the cost incurred by the Navy in providing this NMI (e.g., an 
aviator valuing this NMI at $25,000 would have the bid reduced by $10,000).43 Similar to 
the simple uniform-price model, these adjusted bids were ranked in ascending order. 
Using the equivalent retention goal from Table 25, the model selected the appropriate 
number of aviators for retention. Where reservation prices were the same, the bidders 
with the highest quality scores were retained. The cost to retain the selected aviators was 
set at the first excluded bid. To obtain the equivalent cost of implementing this CRAM, 
the cut-off bid was multiplied by the actual retention goals of the FY-2013 program. 
2. Results 
Table 31 lists the resulting costs of implementing a series of CRAM auctions 
using guaranteed duty station location as an NMI and compares these results against the 
actual costs for the FY-2013 program. As an example, the HSM community had a cut-off 
bid of $75,000—which coincidentally equaled the bonus amount offered in FY-2013—
however, by limiting retention to the desired retention goal of 48 aviators, this CRAM 
model resulted in an equivalent cost of $3,600,000 for a savings of $2,250,000, or a 






                                                 
43 The average cost of all moving-related expenses for a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) move of 
a Naval Officer and any dependents was approximately $15,000 in FY 2013 (Secretary of the Navy, 2014, 
March). The fact that some officers might not require a PCS move or that others would have to move 




Table 31.   CRAM Model (NMI I) Cost Analysis 
Under this CRAM model, the HSC, HSM, and VP NFO communities, which 
over-retained aviators in FY-2013, demonstrated a lower total cost. Additionally, the 
VAQ NFO community, despite having retained more individuals than the FY-2013 
program, still cost less than the current method. The increased costs under this auction 
mechanism for the remaining communities can be attributed to the additional costs 
associated with meeting retention goals. Despite these increases in cost, all community-
specific categories were able to meet retention goals while maintaining bonus payouts 
below congressionally mandated maximums. Furthermore, the Aggregate Retention 
category was able to retain the desired number of aviators in each community at a cost 
that was 6.6% less than the amount spent under the FY-2013 program in an effort to meet 
these same retention objects. Additionally, when correcting the total amount spent on 
Aggregate Retention for over-retention, the cost per aviator decreased by $20,394, or 









 Total Cost  Cut-off Bid 
 Equivalent Total 
Cost 
 Total Cost Δ 
% Total Cost 
Δ
ALL 331             - 351            28,775,000$        75,000$     24,825,000$        -$3,950,000 -13.7%
PILOT 238             - 243            20,600,000$        90,000$     21,420,000$        $820,000 4.0%
NFO 93               - 108            8,175,000$          25,000$     2,325,000$          -$5,850,000 -71.6%
FW CVN 91               - 67              7,975,000$          110,000$   10,010,000$        $2,035,000 25.5%
VFA 62               125,000$   47              5,875,000$          115,000$   7,130,000$          $1,255,000 21.4%
FW LAND 45               - 33              1,900,000$          90,000$     4,050,000$          $2,150,000 113.2%
VP 31               50,000$     23              1,150,000$          75,000$     2,325,000$          $1,175,000 102.2%
HELO 102             - 143            10,725,000$        75,000$     7,650,000$          -$3,075,000 -28.7%
HSC 48               75,000$     58              4,350,000$          85,000$     4,080,000$          -$270,000 -6.2%
HSM 48               75,000$     78              5,850,000$          75,000$     3,600,000$          -$2,250,000 -38.5%
FW CVN 49               - 55              4,250,000$          25,000$     1,225,000$          -$3,025,000 -71.2%
VAQ 17               100,000$   15              1,500,000$          85,000$     1,445,000$          -$55,000 -3.7%
VFA 14               25,000$     5                125,000$             75,000$     1,050,000$          $925,000 740.0%
FW LAND 44               - 53              3,925,000$          15,000$     660,000$             -$3,265,000 -83.2%
VP 28               75,000$     41              3,075,000$          30,000$     840,000$             -$2,235,000 -72.7%
248             - 267            21,925,000$        - 20,470,000$        (1,455,000)$      -6.6%
 Cost Δ %  Δ
-$20,394 -19.8%


















Note: Shaded values do not take into account community-specific retention requirements
1 Includes data from the following communities:  Pilot: VFA, VP, HSC, HSM.  NFO: VAQ, VFA, VP.
Total Cost/Aviator Total Cost/Aviator
102,934$                                  
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G. CRAM MODEL USING NMI II 
1. Analysis 
Under this model, the opportunity to attend an in-residence graduate degree 
program was offered as an NMI. All aviators who in the survey stated a willingness to 
forego more than $45,000 for the guarantee of attending an in-residence graduate degree 
program had their bids reduced by the stated amount, less the $45,000 cost incurred by 
the Navy in providing this NMI (e.g., aviators valuing this NMI at $75,000 would have 
their bids reduced by $30,000).44 Similar to the simple uniform-price model, these 
adjusted bids were then ranked in ascending order. Using the equivalent retention goal 
from Table 25, the model then selected the appropriate number of aviators for retention. 
Where reservation prices were the same, the bidders with the highest quality scores were 
selected for retention. The cost to retain the selected aviators was set at the first excluded 
bid. To obtain the equivalent cost of implementing these CRAM auctions, the cut-off bid 
was multiplied by the corresponding retention goals of the FY-2013 program. 
2. Results 
Table 32 lists the resulting costs of implementing a series of CRAM auctions 
using an in-residence graduate education program as an NMI and compares them against 
the actual costs for the FY-2013 program. As an example, the HSM community had a 
cut-off bid of $75,000—which coincidentally equaled the bonus amount offered in FY-
2013—however, by limiting retention to the desired retention goal of 48 aviators, the 
uniform price auction resulted in an equivalent cost of $3,600,000 for a savings of 
$2,250,000, or a 38.5% reduction in comparison to the FY-2013 program’s actual cost of 
$5,850,000. 
 
                                                 
44 The cost of $45,000 allows for an additional PCS move (approximately $15,000) and the costs to 
the Navy for an officer attending the Naval Postgraduate School for six quarters ($4,850/quarter). In this 




Table 32.   CRAM Model (NMI II) Cost Analysis 
Under this CRAM model, the HSC, HSM, and VP NFO communities, which 
over-retained aviators under the current method, realized a cost savings. The increased 
costs under this auction mechanism for the remaining communities can be attributed to 
the additional costs associated with actually meeting retention goals. Despite these 
increases in cost, all community-specific categories were able to meet retention goals 
while maintaining bonus payouts at or below congressionally mandated maximums. 
Furthermore, under this model the Aggregate Retention category was able to retain the 
desired number of aviators for 1.8% less than the amount expended in attempting to meet 
retention goals for these communities in FY-2013. Correcting the total amount spent on 
Aggregate Retention for over-retention, the cost per aviator decreased by $16,140, or 










 Total Cost  Cut-off Bid 
 Equivalent Total 
Cost 
 Total Cost Δ 
% Total Cost 
Δ
ALL 331             - 351            28,775,000$        75,000$     24,825,000$        -$3,950,000 -13.7%
PILOT 238             - 243            20,600,000$        75,000$     17,850,000$        -$2,750,000 -13.3%
NFO 93               - 108            8,175,000$          45,000$     4,185,000$          -$3,990,000 -48.8%
FW CVN 91               - 67              7,975,000$          110,000$   10,010,000$        $2,035,000 25.5%
VFA 62               125,000$   47              5,875,000$          125,000$   7,750,000$          $1,875,000 31.9%
FW LAND 45               - 33              1,900,000$          60,000$     2,700,000$          $800,000 42.1%
VP 31               50,000$     23              1,150,000$          70,000$     2,170,000$          $1,020,000 88.7%
HELO 102             - 143            10,725,000$        75,000$     7,650,000$          -$3,075,000 -28.7%
HSC 48               75,000$     58              4,350,000$          85,000$     4,080,000$          -$270,000 -6.2%
HSM 48               75,000$     78              5,850,000$          75,000$     3,600,000$          -$2,250,000 -38.5%
FW CVN 49               - 55              4,250,000$          45,000$     2,205,000$          -$2,045,000 -48.1%
VAQ 17               100,000$   15              1,500,000$          95,000$     1,615,000$          $115,000 7.7%
VFA 14               25,000$     5                125,000$             75,000$     1,050,000$          $925,000 740.0%
FW LAND 44               - 53              3,925,000$          45,000$     1,980,000$          -$1,945,000 -49.6%
VP 28               75,000$     41              3,075,000$          45,000$     1,260,000$          -$1,815,000 -59.0%
248             - 267            21,925,000$        - 21,525,000$        -$400,000 -1.8%




















102,934$                                  86,794$                                    
Note: Shaded values do not take into account community-specific retention requirements
1 Includes data from the following communities:  Pilot: VFA, VP, HSC, HSM.  NFO: VAQ, VFA, VP.
Current Method (FY 2013) CRAM NMI II
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H. SUMMARY OF MODEL PERFORMANCE 
The results of these simulations demonstrate the potential for these models—by 
controlling for cost, quantity, and in some cases quality—to more efficiently meet the 
Navy’s retention requirements than the method currently employed by the ACCP 
program. Each model was able to meet the specific retention goals of the communities 
analyzed. Additionally, each model eliminated the additional expenses associated with 
over-retention. The QUAD model demonstrated the potential to simultaneously improve 
cost and quality. The CRAM models demonstrated the greatest potential of all the models 
for improving retention costs. Table 33 summarizes these improvements over the 
uniform-price auction. In general, the first QUAD model improved both quality and cost, 
while the second QUAD model demonstrated larger improvements in quality, but 
resulted in higher costs than the uniform-price model. Both CRAM models resulted in 
overall cost savings; however, using NMI I resulted in greater cost in comparison to the 
uniform-price model. Moreover, given the results of the Aggregate Retention category, 
its appears possible that the CRAM model could both meet overall retention goals while 
actually lowering overall ACCP program costs. 
 










 Cost  % Cost 
 Qlty 
Score 
 Cost  % Cost 
 Qlty 
Score 
 Cost  % Cost 
 Qlty 
Score 
 Cost  % Cost 
 Qlty 
Score 
ALL $28,135,000 8.44    -$150,605 -0.5% 0.18    $702,051 2.5% 1.26    -$3,310,000 -11.8% -0.09 -$3,310,000 -11.8% -0.35
PILOT $23,800,000 7.77    $1,034,824 4.3% 0.37    $2,328,354 9.8% 0.39    -$2,380,000 -10.0% 0.10 -$5,950,000 -25.0% 0.10
NFO $4,650,000 10.40  $465,000 10.0% -      $930,000 20.0% -      -$2,325,000 -50.0% -0.35 -$465,000 -10.0% 0.00
FW CVN $10,010,000 8.36    -$585,039 -5.8% 1.14    -$259,987 -2.6% 2.07    $0 0.0% 0.00 $0 0.0% 0.00
VFA $7,750,000 9.40    -$620,000 -8.0% -      $310,000 4.0% 0.80    -$620,000 -8.0% -0.20 $0 0.0% 0.00
FW LAND $4,500,000 6.50    $281,250 6.3% 0.63    $562,500 12.5% -      -$450,000 -10.0% -0.50 -$1,800,000 -40.0% -0.12
VP $3,875,000 6.00    -$775,000 -20.0% -      -$775,000 -20.0% 0.83    -$1,550,000 -40.0% -0.67 -$1,705,000 -44.0% -0.67
HELO $8,670,000 7.88    $425,034 4.9% -      $42,534 0.5% 0.79    -$1,020,000 -11.8% 0.41 -$1,020,000 -11.8% -0.17
HSC $4,800,000 8.06    $150,000 3.1% -      $300,000 6.3% 0.75    -$720,000 -15.0% 0.38 -$720,000 -15.0% 0.50
HSM $3,600,000 8.00    $300,000 8.3% -      $600,000 16.7% 1.88    $0 0.0% 0.00 $0 0.0% -0.37
FW CVN $2,450,000 10.71  $210,014 8.6% -      $524,986 21.4% -      -$1,225,000 -50.0% -0.42 -$245,000 -10.0% 0.00
VAQ $1,700,000 8.88    $106,250 6.3% 2.12    $106,250 6.3% 3.62    -$255,000 -15.0% -0.25 -$85,000 -5.0% -0.25
VFA $1,050,000 10.00  $0 0.0% -      $116,662 11.1% 1.50    $0 0.0% 0.00 $0 0.0% 0.00
FW LAND $2,860,000 9.67    $0 0.0% -      $366,652 12.8% -      -$2,200,000 -76.9% 1.58 -$880,000 -30.8% 0.00
VP $2,100,000 8.00    $0 0.0% -      $233,324 11.1% -      -$1,260,000 -60.0% 0.00 -$840,000 -40.0% 0.00
$24,875,000 8.37 -$838,750 -3.4% 0.27    $891,236 3.6% 1.30 -$4,845,000 -19.5% -0.02 -$2,825,000 -11.4% -0.01













QUAD Model I Δ QUAD Model II Δ
Aggregate 
Retention1,2
Uniform Price CRAM NMI I Δ
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. SUMMARY 
Our primary objective of this research was to examine the feasibility and potential 
improvements of implementing a uniform-price auction-based retention program in lieu 
of the current bonus system used for retaining Naval Aviators who have completed their 
MSR. Additionally, we examined the impacts of implementing both a QUAD auction and 
a CRAM. Using the survey results of 175 Naval Aviators enrolled in an NPS in-residence 
or distance-learning graduate program, we analyzed the effects these auction mechanisms 
might have on the quantity, cost, and quality of retained Naval Aviators. We used the 
survey responses along with quality rating scales developed from historical DH selection 
rates to establish individual quality scores and reservation prices. We then ran multiple 
simulations using the retention goals and results of the most recently completed ACCP 
program (FY-2013). We then measured these results against those of the FY-2013 ACCP 
program. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Our research demonstrated a potential for improvements over the current Naval 
Aviator retention bonus program in terms of cost, quality, and quality of aviators 
retained. Our findings support previous research on auctions as retention mechanisms 
(Nowell, 2012). 
With regard to cost, these auction mechanisms demonstrated costs-savings in the 
retention of communities that experienced over-retention in FY-2013. Using the uniform-
price model, individual communities with over-retention in the FY-2013 program saved 
as much as $2,250,000 in retention costs. The additional costs associated with meeting 
retention goals for communities that had under-retained in FY-2013 resulted in 
Aggregate Retention costs for the uniform-price model exceeding the FY-2013 costs by 
$2,950,000, or 13.5%. In correcting for over-retention, however, we find that the amount 
spent per aviator retained in support of FY-2013 naval aviation requirements actually 
decreases by 2.6%. Additionally, while not specifically researched in this study, by not 
exceeding retention goals these mechanisms may serve to provide further savings by 
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reducing the manning overages of field grade officers currently existing in naval aviation 
(CNP, personal communication, 2014, February 11).45 
While the two methodologies we used to measure aviator quality found no 
significant correlation between an officer’s quality and the cost to retain them beyond 
their initial MSR (Table 20), the QUAD models we employed demonstrated the potential 
to improve upon the results of the uniform-price model by improving both overall 
retention costs and the average quality of aviators retained. The first model, which 
employs a discount of $25,000 to the top 10% from each community, meets all retention 
goals while increasing the average quality of retained aviators by 3.2% and reducing 
Aggregate Retention costs by $838,750, or 3.4%, when compared to the uniform-price 
model. The second QUAD model, which applies a $50,000 discount to the top 50% from 
each community, further increases average aviator quality by 15.5% over the uniform-
price model. This, however, comes at a cost of an additional $896,236, or 3.6%, in 
Aggregate Retention costs. In addition to the obvious desire to retain officers who have 
demonstrated superior performance, these models may further reduce retention costs 
(financially and operationally). By improving the quality of Naval Aviators retained and 
thereby decreasing the probability that these officers will fail to select for promotion or 
screen for DH, the Navy can reduce the expense associated with providing bonuses to 
personnel who fail to serve in the capacity for which they were retained (Table 10). 
Furthermore, in minimizing these attritions, Force managers can reduce the number of 
officers they need to retain in support of naval aviation requirements. 
The two CRAM models demonstrated the largest improvements in Aggregate 
Retention costs. The first model offers guaranteed duty station as an NMI. Leveraging the 
utility aviators receive from this NMI in excess of the Navy’s cost to provide it, results in 
a savings of more than $4,800,000 in Aggregate Retention costs when compared to the 
uniform-price model. Moreover, this model meets FY-2013 retention goals while saving 
more than $1,400,000 over the current method. The second CRAM model employs the 
guarantee of an in-residence graduate program as an NMI. Leveraging the utility aviators 
                                                 
45 This information was communicated via an unpublished power point presentation. 
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receive from this NMI in excess of the Navy’s cost to provide it, results in a savings of 
more than $2,800,000 in Aggregate Retention costs when compared to the uniform-price 
model. This second CRAM model also meets all FY-2013 retention objectives and saves 
1.8% when compared to the current ACCP program. 
The ability of theses mechanisms to meet retention goals where the current bonus 
method does not better supports naval aviation in meeting its mission requirements. This 
aspect may have a positive impact on retention that is more difficult to quantify. 
Currently, to manage retention shortfalls Force planners are required to extend personnel 
in demanding positions or to leave those positions vacant. This increases the strain on 
those who do elect to remain on Active Duty. By adequately filling these positions and 
reducing the burden on servicemembers, these mechanisms may reduce the amount 
required to induce Naval Aviators to continue to serve beyond their MSR. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While our study builds on the research of other authors (Nowell, 2012; White 
2010), further research may still be required to validate the results found here. A survey 
that encompasses a larger set of Naval Aviators might be desirable to evaluate if the 
trends found here are unique to aviators attending a NPS graduate education program. 
Furthermore, while our research did attempt to explain and access participants’ 
understanding of an auction-based retention system, a more controlled study could yield a 
better assessment of how likely participants might behave under an auction-based system. 
The metrics and system used to determine individual quality scores are believed to 
accurately model the value naval aviation places on individual aviators. We, however, did 
not have access to data that might better reflect the correlation between individual 
performance traits and their value to aviation communities. With the support of Force 
managers, additional research could better define this relationship enabling a more 
precise implementation of QUAD auction mechanisms. 
Lastly, as participants in this and other surveys (NPRST, 2014) have stated, 
monetary incentives are but one aspect that influence officers to remain in naval aviation. 
These sentiments are reflected in the value participants placed on the NMIs used in this 
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APPENDIX A. VALUES, CAREER PATH AND MILESTONES FOR 
AVIATION OFFICERS 
NPC provides the following to promotion and screening boards to inform members of the 
career path and milestones valued by the naval aviation community: 




2. Aviation Officer Career Progression and Milestones 
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APPENDIX B. NAVAL AVIATOR FLIGHT TRAINING PROGRESSION 
The typical training progression for CNATRA trained aviators is depicted in the following 
charts. 
1. Flight Training Progression - Pilot 
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2. Flight Training Progression - Naval Flight Officer 
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APPENDIX C. SUMMARY OF PAST ACCP PROGRAM PERFORMANCE 
1. Fiscal Year 2011 ACCP Performance Summary 
 
 
TOTAL COST AVTRS EXCESS AVTRS SHRTG TOTAL OVERPAY % OVERPAY
18,700,000$   19                      76                     950,000$               5.1%
COMM ELIGIBLE REQUIRED RETAINED % RETAINED % OF REQ'D BONUS COST PILOT EXCESS PILOT SHRTG OVERPAYMENT % OVERPAY
TOTAL 551 221 188 33.4% 80.1% ---------- 14,200,000$   16                      49                     800,000$               5.6%
HELO 233 80 86 36.9% 107.5% ---------- 4,300,000$     16                      10                     800,000$               18.6%
HM 16 5 4 25.0% 80.0% 50,000$     200,000$        -                    1                       -$                       N/A
HSC 106 47 38 35.8% 80.9% 50,000$     1,900,000$     -                    9                       -$                       N/A
HSL/HSM 111 28 44 39.6% 157.1% 50,000$     2,200,000$     16                      -                   800,000$               36.4%
JET 162 87 71 43.8% 81.6% ---------- 8,575,000$     -                    16                     -                         
VAQ 19 8 6 31.6% 75.0% 75,000$     450,000$        -                    2                       -$                       N/A
VFA 143 79 65 45.5% 82.3% 125,000$   8,125,000$     -                    14                     -$                       N/A
PROP 156 54 31 19.9% 57.4% ---------- 1,325,000$     -                    23                     -                         N/A
VAW/VRC 28 9 5 17.9% 55.6% 25,000$     125,000$        -                    4                       -$                       N/A
VP 85 35 20 23.5% 57.1% 50,000$     1,000,000$     -                    15                     -$                       N/A
VQ(P) 17 5 2 11.8% 40.0% 50,000$     100,000$        -                    3                       -$                       N/A
VQ(T) 26 5 4 15.4% 80.0% 25,000$     100,000$        -                    1                       -$                       N/A
ELIGIBLE REQUIRED RETAINED % RETAINED % OF REQ'D BONUS COST NFO EXCESS NFO SHRTG OVERPAYMENT % OVERPAY
TOTAL 291 101 77 26.5% 76.2% ---------- 4,500,000$     3                        27                     150,000$               3.3%
JET 99 48 35 35.4% 72.9% ---------- 2,650,000$     3                        16                     150,000$               5.7%
VAQ 45 34 18 40.0% 52.9%  $  100,000 1,800,000$     -                    16                     -$                       N/A
VFA 54 14 17 31.5% 121.4% 50,000$     850,000$        3                        -                   150,000$               17.6%
PROP 192 53 42 21.9% 79.2% ---------- 1,850,000$     -                    11                     -$                       N/A
VAW/VRC 46 14 8 17.4% 57.1% 25,000$     200,000$        -                    6                       -$                       N/A
VP 107 27 25 23.4% 92.6% 50,000$     1,250,000$     -                    2                       -$                       N/A
VQ(P) 27 8 7 25.9% 87.5% 50,000$     350,000$        -                    1                       -$                       N/A
VQ(T) 12 4 2 16.7% 50.0% 25,000$     50,000$          -                    2                       -$                       N/A
82.3% 76.4%31.5%
842 322 265
% RETAINED % of RETENTION GOAL % of TARGETED GOAL
OVERALL RETENTION SUMMARY




2. Fiscal Year 2012 ACCP Performance Summary 
 
 
TOTAL COST AVTRS EXCESS AVTRS SHRTG TOTAL OVERPAY % OVERPAY
22,900,000$   12                      39                     850,000$               3.7%
COMM ELIGIBLE REQUIRED RETAINED % RETAINED % OF REQ'D BONUS COST PILOT EXCESS PILOT SHRTG OVERPAYMENT % OVERPAY
TOTAL 659 241 231 35.1% 95.9% ---------- 17,150,000$   6                        16                     550,000$               3.2%
HELO 316 116 106 33.5% 91.4% ---------- 5,225,000$     1                        11                     25,000$                 0.5%
HM 19 7 7 36.8% 100.0% 50,000$     350,000$        -                    -                   -$                       N/A
HSC 133 59 48 36.1% 81.4% 75,000$     3,600,000$     -                    11                     -$                       N/A
HSL/HSM 164 50 51 31.1% 102.0% 25,000$     1,275,000$     1                        -                   25,000$                 2.0%
JET 139 70 71 51.1% 101.4% ---------- 8,875,000$     3                        2                       375,000                 
VAQ 17 10 8 47.1% 80.0% 125,000$   1,000,000$     -                    2                       -$                       N/A
VFA 122 60 63 51.6% 105.0% 125,000$   7,875,000$     3                        -                   375,000$               4.8%
PROP 204 55 54 26.5% 98.2% ---------- 3,050,000$     2                        3                       150,000                 N/A
VAW/VRC 43 12 9 20.9% 75.0% 50,000$     450,000$        -                    3                       -$                       N/A
VP 119 31 31 26.1% 100.0% 50,000$     1,550,000$     -                    -                   -$                       N/A
VQ(P) 22 7 7 31.8% 100.0% 75,000$     525,000$        -                    -                   -$                       N/A
VQ(T) 20 5 7 35.0% 140.0% 75,000$     525,000$        2                        -                   150,000$               28.6%
ELIGIBLE REQUIRED RETAINED % RETAINED % OF REQ'D BONUS COST NFO EXCESS NFO SHRTG OVERPAYMENT % OVERPAY
TOTAL 354 102 85 24.0% 83.3% ---------- 5,750,000$     6                        23                     300,000$               5.2%
JET 135 39 32 23.7% 82.1% ---------- 2,350,000$     3                        10                     150,000$               6.4%
VAQ 61 25 15 24.6% 60.0%  $  100,000 1,500,000$     -                    10                     -$                       N/A
VFA 74 14 17 23.0% 121.4% 50,000$     850,000$        3                        -                   150,000$               17.6%
PROP 219 63 53 24.2% 84.1% ---------- 3,400,000$     3                        13                     150,000$               4.4%
VAW/VRC 71 15 18 25.4% 120.0% 50,000$     900,000$        3                        -                   150,000$               16.7%
VP 101 34 28 27.7% 82.4% 75,000$     2,100,000$     -                    6                       -$                       N/A
VQ(P) 34 8 5 14.7% 62.5% 50,000$     250,000$        -                    3                       -$                       N/A
VQ(T) 13 6 2 15.4% 33.3% 75,000$     150,000$        -                    4                       -$                       N/A
AVTRS RETAINED
1013 343 316
% of RETENTION GOAL % of TARGETED GOAL







3. Fiscal Year 2013 ACCP Performance Summary 
 
TOTAL COST AVTRS EXCESS AVTRS SHRTG TOTAL OVERPAY % OVERPAY
28,775,000$   71                      51                     5,325,000$            18.5%
COMM ELIGIBLE REQUIRED RETAINED % RETAINED % OF REQ'D BONUS COST PILOT EXCESS PILOT SHRTG OVERPAYMENT % OVERPAY
TOTAL 649 238 243 37.4% 102.1% ---------- 20,600,000$   41                      36                     3,075,000$            14.9%
HELO 287 102 143 49.8% 140.2% ---------- 10,725,000$   41                      -                   3,075,000$            28.7%
HM 16 6 7 43.8% 116.7% 75,000$     525,000$        1                        -                   75,000$                 14.3%
HSC 133 48 58 43.6% 120.8% 75,000$     4,350,000$     10                      -                   750,000$               17.2%
HSL/HSM 138 48 78 56.5% 162.5% 75,000$     5,850,000$     30                      -                   2,250,000$            38.5%
JET 157 73 51 32.5% 69.9% ---------- 6,375,000$     -                    22                     -                         
VAQ 20 11 4 20.0% 36.4% 125,000$   500,000$        -                    7                       -$                       N/A
VFA 137 62 47 34.3% 75.8% 125,000$   5,875,000$     -                    15                     -$                       N/A
PROP 205 63 49 23.9% 77.8% ---------- 3,500,000$     -                    14                     -                         N/A
VAW/VRC 44 18 16 36.4% 88.9% 100,000$   1,600,000$     -                    2                       -$                       N/A
VP 125 31 23 18.4% 74.2% 50,000$     1,150,000$     -                    8                       -$                       N/A
VQ(P) 20 6 4 20.0% 66.7% 75,000$     300,000$        -                    2                       -$                       N/A
VQ(T) 16 8 6 37.5% 75.0% 75,000$     450,000$        -                    2                       -$                       N/A
ELIGIBLE REQUIRED RETAINED % RETAINED % OF REQ'D BONUS COST NFO EXCESS NFO SHRTG OVERPAYMENT % OVERPAY
TOTAL 322 93 108 33.5% 116.1% ---------- 8,175,000$     30                      15                     2,250,000$            27.5%
JET 105 31 20 19.0% 64.5% ---------- 1,625,000$     -                    11                     -$                       N/A
VAQ 49 17 15 30.6% 88.2%  $  100,000 1,500,000$     -                    2                       -$                       N/A
VFA 56 14 5 8.9% 35.7% 25,000$     125,000$        -                    9                       -$                       N/A
PROP 217 62 88 40.6% 141.9% ---------- 6,550,000$     30                      4                       2,250,000$            34.4%
VAW/VRC 69 18 35 50.7% 194.4% 75,000$     2,625,000$     17                      -                   1,275,000$            48.6%
VP 107 28 41 38.3% 146.4% 75,000$     3,075,000$     13                      -                   975,000$               31.7%
VQ(P) 26 8 7 26.9% 87.5% 50,000$     350,000$        -                    1                       -$                       N/A
VQ(T) 15 8 5 33.3% 62.5% 100,000$   500,000$        -                    3                       -$                       N/A
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APPENDIX D. COPY OF SURVEY 
INFORMED CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATING 
IN THIS RESEARCH SURVEY 
The purpose of this research survey entitled: Market-Based Approach to Aviator Retention is to assess the 
possibilities for improving the current aviator retention program. 
This survey has 41 questions. Depending on your individual aviation career, you may or may not be asked 
some of the questions. Estimated completion time is 15 minutes. 
Your participation in this survey is strictly voluntary. The data collected will NOT become part of your 
permanent record and will NOT affect your career in anyway. If you do choose to participate in this survey, 
you may decline to answer any questions and are free to withdraw from taking the survey at any time. 
Any data provided will be maintained in accordance with DOD policy. Be assured that any information you 
provide will be used responsibly and protected from unauthorized access; however, as with any data 
collection process there is the minor risk that the information collected could be inappropriately disclosed. 
If you have any questions regarding this research, contact Dr. Noah Myung at noah.myung@nps.edu or 
831-656-2811; alternatively, contact LCDR Eric Kelso at ewkelso@nps.edu. If you have any questions 
regarding your rights as a research subject, please contact the NPS Institutional Review Board Chair, Dr. 
Larry Shattuck, at lgshattu@nps.edu or 831-656-2473. 
1.  
I have read this informed consent document. I 
understand that, before taking this survey, I may ask 
questions and have them answered to my satisfaction. I 
further understand that by selecting "Yes" below I 
agree to participate in this research, and I do not waive 
any of my legal rights. * 
  Yes 
  No 
If you wish to retain a copy of this statement for your personal records, please print this screen. 
 
AVIATION CAREER CONTINUATION PAY 
(ACCP) 
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ACCP is also referred to as the "Aviation Bonus" or the "Department Head Bonus." ACCP is offered as an 
incentive to all eligible aviators, who in exchange for a cash bonus, agree to remain on active duty beyond 
their Minimum Service Requirement and complete an Aviation "Department Head Tour." The following table 
lists the most recent bonus amounts for individual communities: 










2. Have you accepted or submitted an ACCP contract? 
  Yes 
  No 
3. (Not asked if Q2=no) What was the total amount for 
your ACCP contract? 
  $25,000 
  $50,000 
  $75,000 
  $100,000 
  $125,000 
  Other  
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4. How much of an affect does/did ACCP have on your 
decision to stay in the Navy? 
  No affect at all 
  Very little affect 
  Somewhat affected 
  Affected very much 
5. (Not asked if Q2=Yes) Assuming the ACCP bonus for 
your community were to remain the same as listed 
above, how likely would you be to accept the bonus? 
  Very Unlikely (Less than a 15% chance of accepting the bonus) 
  Unlikely (Between 15%-30% chance of accepting the bonus) 
  Somewhat Unlikely (Between 30%-45% chance of accepting the bonus) 
  Neutral / Uncertain (Between 45%-55% chance of accepting the bonus) 
  Somewhat Likely (Between 55%-70% chance of accepting the bonus) 
  Likely (Between 70%-85% chance of accepting the bonus) 








6. How likely would you accept the bonus and agree to 
complete a "Department Head Tour" if the following 
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TOTAL bonus amounts were offered to you (percentages 

































       
$25,000 
       
$50,000 
       
$75,000 
       
$100,00
0        
$125,00
0        
$150,00
0        
$175,00
0        
 
7. Please state how much you AGREE with the following 


































       




























































       
8. Please provide any additional comments in regard to 










MARKET-BASED RETENTION SYSTEM 
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Suppose the Navy replaces the current ACCP program with one that uses an auction-based system to 
determine the bonus amount for a specified number of contracts. 
 This auction-based format would work in the following manner: Suppose there are 100 aviators eligible to 
receive retention bonuses and the Navy announces it will seek to retain 60 of those aviators. Each aviator 
would individually and privately submit a bid with the minimum bonus amount he or she would be willing to 
accept in exchange for agreeing to complete a “Department Head Tour.” 
 The Navy would compile all the bids and award the bonuses to the 60 aviators with the lowest bids, but it 
would pay each of them the amount listed in the 61st lowest bid (e.g., if the 61st lowest bid was $75,000 
then the 60 winning aviators would each receive $75,000, even though each had agreed to accept a lower 
amount). The remaining aviators would not receive bonuses and would not be obligated to serve a 
“Department Head Tour.” 
 This auction format is designed to be in a bidder’s best interest to bid truthfully. That is, there is no incentive 
to "game" the system by overbidding or underbidding. 
9. Assume you are in a group of 140 aviators eligible to 
receive a retention bonus. If, under the system 
described above, the Navy's goal is to retain 65 aviators 
what is the amount you would likely submit for your bid 
(total bonus amount)? 
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  $ 0 / No bonus 
required 
  $ 5,000 
  $ 10,000 
  $ 15,000 
  $ 20,000 
  $ 25,000 
  $ 30,000 
  $ 35,000 
  $ 40,000 
  $ 45,000 
  $ 50,000 
  $ 55,000 
  $ 60,000 
  $ 65,000 
  $ 70,000 
  $ 75,000 
  $ 80,000 
  $ 85,000 
  $ 90,000 
  $ 95,000 
  $100,000 
  $105,000 
  $110,000 
  $115,000 
  $120,000 
  $125,000 
  $130,000 
  $135,000 
  $140,000 
  $145,000 
  $150,000 
  $155,000 
  $160,000 
  $165,000 
  $170,000 
  $175,000 
  More than $175,000 / 
Do not wish to be 
retained 
Note: This value should be the MINIMUM amount you would be satisfied with in exchange for obligating to 
serve a DH tour.  
10. How well do you feel you understand the auction-
based system described above (e.g., who is retained, 
how bonus amount is determined, how you should bid)? 
  Clearly Understand 
  Sufficiently Understand 
  Somewhat Understand 
  Do not Understand 
11. Please specify the location you would prefer to be 
stationed for your "Department Head Tour": 
  Not Applicable 
  CONUS Central 
  CONUS East Coast 
  CONUS West Coast 
  OCONUS 
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12. What is the equivalent cash bonus you would be 
willing to forgo for the guarantee of serving in your 
preferred duty station? 
13. Suppose as part of the “Aviation Bonus,” was the 
option to attend an in-residence degree program lieu of 
some other “due-course” career path option (e.g., 
shortening or foregoing a “Disassociated Sea Tour” to 
attend the Naval Postgraduate School). Assume that in 
addition to a cash bonus you were offered this option. 
How interested would you be in the in-residence degree 
portion of the bonus? 
  Not at all Interested 
  Indifferent / Don’t Know 
  Somewhat Interested 
  Very Interested 
  Extremely Interested 
 
14. What is the equivalent cash bonus you would be 
willing to forgo for the guarantee of attending a Naval 
Aviation Enterprise (NAE) supported in-residence 
degree program like the one described in question 13? 
 
15. In addition to the two options listed in questions 11 
and 13 is there any other non-monetary incentive that 
might increase your willingness to stay in the Navy after 
completing your initial service obligation? 
16. What is the equivalent cash bonus you would be 
willing to forgo for the guarantee of the option you 
listed in question 15? 
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17. Please provide any additional comments in regard to 










Please answer the following questions based on your PERSONAL experience / opinion: 
18. Use the following scale to answer how the factors 
below affect/affected your decision to STAY on Active 
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19. Please provide any additional comments in regard to 
questions in this section: 
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FIRST SEA TOUR 
The following questions are in regard to your "FIRST SEA TOUR" (i.e., your first operational fleet squadron): 
20. What is your parent aviation community? 
  HM 
  HSC/HS 
  HSM/HSL 
  VAQ 
  VAW 
  VFA 
  VP 
  VQ(P) 
  VQ(T) 
  VRC 
  Other  
  
21. Where were you stationed / homeported for your 
"First Sea Tour"? 
  Not Applicable 
  CONUS Central 
  CONUS East Coast 
  CONUS West Coast 
  OCONUS 
  Other  
  
22. (Not asked if Q21=N/A) What was your ranking on 
your final competitive FITREP during your "First SEA 
Tour"? 
  Not Applicable 
  #1 EP 
  #2 or greater EP / unnumbered EP 
  #1 MP 
  #2 or greater MP / unnumbered MP 
A "competitive" FITREP  is any FITREP with a summary group of more than "1" (typically a Periodic or 
Detachment of Reporting Senior report and not a Detachment of Individual report) 
 
FIRST SHORE TOUR 
The following questions are in regard to your "FIRST SHORE TOUR" (i.e., the command you were assigned 
to immediately following your "First SEA Tour"): 
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23. What type of command did you serve in for your 
"First SHORE Tour"?  
  Not Applicable 
  EWTG 
  Flag Aide 
  Fleet Replacement 
Squadron 
  GSA / ISA 
  HT Squadron 
  HX Squadron 
  Naval Safety Center 
  NPC 
  NPS 
  NSAWC 
  OLA 
  ONI 
  OPNAV 
  PEP 
  PMRF 
  ROTC 
  Staff, Base 
  Staff, Flag 
  Staff, Wing 
  Station SAR 
  TSC 
  USNA 
  VFC 
  VT Squadron 
  VX Squadron 
  Weapons School 
  Other  
  
24. (Not asked if Q23=N/A) Where were you stationed / 
homeported?  
  CONUS Central 
  CONUS East Coast 
  CONUS West Coast 
  OCONUS 
  Other  
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25. (Not asked if Q23=N/A) What was your ranking on 
your final competitive FITREP during your "First SHORE 
Tour"? 
  Not Applicable 
  #1 EP 
  #2 or greater EP / unnumbered EP 
  #1 MP 
  #2 or greater MP / unnumbered MP 
A "competitive" FITREP is any FITREP with a summary group of more than "1" (typically a Periodic or 
Detachment of Reporting Senior report and not a Detachment of Individual report) 
SECOND SEA TOUR 
The following questions are in regard to your "SECOND SEA TOUR" (i.e., Disassociated Sea Tour): 
26. What position did you hold during your "Second SEA 
Tour"? 
  Not Applicable 
  Amphib, Ship's Company 
  CVN, Ship's Company 
  Squadron Tactics / Training Officer 
  Staff, CVW 
  Staff, DESRON 
  Staff, Fleet 
  Staff, PHIBRON 
  Super JO 
  Other  
  
27. (Not asked if Q26=N/A) Where were you stationed / 
homeported? 
  CONUS Central 
  CONUS East Coast 
  CONUS West Coast 
  OCONUS 
  Other  
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28. (Not asked if Q26=N/A) What was your ranking on 
your final competitive FITREP during your "Second SEA 
Tour"? 
  Not Applicable 
  #1 EP 
  #2 or greater EP / unnumbered EP 
  #1 MP 
  #2 or greater MP / unnumbered MP 
A "competitive" FITREP is any FITREP with a summary group of more than "1" (typically a Periodic or 
Detachment of Reporting Senior report and not a Detachment of Individual report). 
DEPARTMENT HEAD TOUR 
The following questions are in regard to your squadron "DEPARTMENT HEAD TOUR": 
29. Have you been screened for Department Head? 
  Yes 
  No (Not Yet Eligible) 
  No (1 Time Failure to Select) 
  No (2 Time Failure to Select) 
30. (Not asked if Q29=No) In what community will/did 
you serve your "Department Head Tour"? 
  Not Applicable 
  HM 
  HSC/HS 
  HSM/HSL 
  HT 
  VAQ 
  VAW 
  VFA 
  VP 
  VQ(P) 
  VQ(T) 
  VRC 
  VT 
  Other  
  
 113 
31. (Not asked if Q30=N/A) Where is/was your 
assigned duty station? 
  CONUS Central 
  CONUS East Coast 
  CONUS West Coast 
  OCONUS 
  Other  
  
32. (Not asked if Q30=N/A) What was your ranking on 
your final competitive FITREP during your "Department 
Head Tour"? 
  Not Applicable 
  #1 EP 
  #2 or greater EP / unnumbered EP 
  #1 MP 
  #2 or greater MP / unnumbered MP 
A "competitive" FITREP is any FITREP with a summary group of more than "1" (typically a Periodic or 
Detachment of Reporting Senior report and not a Detachment of Individual report). 
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
The following questions refer to your basic demographic information: 
33. Commissioning Source: 
  U.S. Naval Academy 
  ROTC 
  OCS 
  STA-21 
  ECP 




  O-3 
  O-3E 
  O-4 
  O-5 
35. Warfare Designator: 
  Pilot 
  NFO 
36. Fiscal Year Designated (i.e., "Winged"): 
  1994 or prior 
  1995 
  1996 
  1997 
  1998 
  1999 
  2000 
  2001 
  2002 
  2003 
  2004 
  2005 
  2006 
  2007 
  2008 
  2009 
  2010 
  2011 
  2012 or later 
Note: A Fiscal Year runs from 01 October the previous calender year to 30 September in the same calender 
year (e.g., Fiscal Year 2000 was from 01 October 1999 to 30 September 2000) 
37. What is the highest level of education you have 
completed?  
  Bachelor's Degree 
  Some Postgraduate Education 
  Master's Degree 
  Doctorate 
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38. Please select any additional qualifications / 
experience you have earned (select all that apply): 
  CDO 
  JPME 
  OOD 
  SWO Pin 
  TAO 
  SFTI / WTI 
  Flag Aide 
  GSA / IA 
 Other:  
  
39. Gender: 
  Female 
  Male 
40. Marital Status: 
  Single / Never Married 
  Married / Civil Union 
  Divorced / Separated 
  Widowed 
CONCLUSION 
41. Please add any additional comments you wish to 
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APPENDIX E. RESIDUAL PLOTS OF INDIVIDUAL QUALITY 





































































LIST OF REFERENCES 
Chief of Naval Air Training. (2012, March 19). CNATRA Instruction 3501.1C: 
Introductory flight screening (IFS) program. Corpus Christi, TX: Department of 
the Navy. Retrieved 2014, March 18, from 
http://www.cnatra.navy.mil/pubs/folder2/3501.1C.pdf 
Chief of Naval Air Training. (n.d.a). Aviator training. Retrieved 2014, March 25, from 
Chief of Naval Air Training: http://www.cnatra.navy.mil/training_pilot.htm 
Chief of Naval Air Training. (n.d.b April 8). CNATRA Homepage. Retrieved 2014, April 
8, from Chief of Naval Air Training: http://www.cnatra.navy.mil/index.htm 
Chief of Naval Air Training. (n.d.c). Flight officer training. Retrieved 2014, March 25, 
from Chief of Naval Air Training: 
http://www.cnatra.navy.mil/training_officer.htm 
Chief of Naval Operations. (1996). NAVADMIN 250/96: Aviation continuation pay 
(ACP). Washington, DC: U.S. Navy. Retrieved 2014, February 12, via e-mail 
from BUPERS_WEBMASTER BUPERS_WEBMASTER@nmci-isf.com  
Chief of Naval Operations. (1998). NAVADMIN 230/98: FY-99 Aviation continuation 
pay (ACP). Washington, DC: U.S. Navy. Retrieved 2014, February 12, via e-mail 
from BUPERS_WEBMASTER BUPERS_WEBMASTER@nmci-isf.com 
Chief of Naval Operations. (1999). NAVADMIN 295/99: FY-00 Aviation career 
continuation pay (ACCP). Washington, DC: U.S. Navy. Retrieved 2014, February 
12, via e-mail from BUPERS_WEBMASTER BUPERS_WEBMASTER@nmci-
isf.com 
Chief of Naval Operations. (2000). NAVADMIN 258/00: FY-01 Aviation career 
continuation pay (ACCP). Washington, DC: U.S. Navy. Retrieved 2014, February 
10, from http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2000/nav00258.txt 
Chief of Naval Operations. (2003). NAVADMIN 293/03: FY-04 Aviation career 
continuation pay (ACCP). Washington, DC: U.S. Navy. Retrieved 2014, June 20, 
from http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2003/nav03293.txt 
Chief of Naval Operations. (2004). NAVADMIN 279/04: FY-05 Aviation career 




Chief of Naval Operations. (2005a). OPNAV INSTRUCTION 7220.9: Navy aviation 
career continuation pay (Navy Instruction). Washington, DC: Department of the 
Navy. Retrieved 2014, April 20, from 
https://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/07000%20Financial%20Management%20Ser
vices/07-200%20Disbursing%20Services/7220.9.pdf 
Chief of Naval Operations. (2005b). NAVADMIN 335/05: FY-06 Aviation career 
continuation pay. Washington, DC: U.S. Navy. Retrieved 2014, June 20, from 
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2005/NAV05335.txt 
Chief of Naval Operations. (2006). NAVADMIN 381/06: FY-07 Aviation career 
continuation pay. Washington, DC: U.S. Navy. Retrieved 2014, June 20, from 
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2006/NAV06381.txt 
Chief of Naval Operations. (2007). NAVADMIN 343/07: FY-08 Aviation career 
continuation pay. Washington, DC: U.S. Navy. Retrieved 2014, June 20, from 
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2007/NAV07343.txt 
Chief of Naval Operations. (2009). NAVADMIN 019/09: FY-09 Aviation career 
continuation pay. Washington, DC: U.S. Navy. Retrieved 2014, June 20, from 
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2009/NAV09019.txt 
Chief of Naval Operations. (2010). NAVADMIN 032/10: FY-10 Aviation career 
continuation pay (Navy Administrative Message). Washington, DC: U.S. Navy. 
Retrieved 2014, June 04, from http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2010/NAV10032.txt  
Chief of Naval Operations. (2011). NAVADMIN 296/11: FY-11 Aviation career 
continuation pay. Washington, DC: U.S. Navy. Retrieved 2014, June 20, from 
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2011/NAV11168.txt 
Chief of Naval Operations. (2012). NAVADMIN 055/12: FY-12 Aviation career 
continuation pay. Washington, DC: U.S. Navy. Retrieved 2014, June 20, from 
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2012/NAV12055.txt 
Chief of Naval Operations. (2013). NAVADMIN 047/13: FY-13 Aviation career 
continuation pay (Navy Administrative Message). Washington, DC: U.S. Navy. 
Retrieved 2013, January 13, from http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2013/NAV13047.txt  
 135 
Chief of Naval Personnel. (2011). BUPERSINST 1610.10C: Navy performance 
evaluation system (Navy Instruction). Millington, TN: Department of the Navy. 
Retrieved 2014, June 4, from http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/instructions/bupersinstructions/documents/1610.10c.pdf 
Chief of Naval Personnel. (2013, May). Aviation command screen board lessons learned. 
(PowerPoint Presentation). Retrieved 2014, April 9, from Naval Personnel 
Command: http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/boards/screenboards/aviation/Pages/default2.aspx 
Chief of Naval Personnel. (2013, May 13). Naval personnel command (Navy 
Memorandum). Retrieved March 20, 2014, from First Shore Tour Slating Process: 
VFA Junior Officer Detailer memo to Fleet Junior Officers: 
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/officer/Detailing/aviation/detailers/Documents/432GVFAJOBoilerPlate.pdf  
Coughlan, P. J., & Gates, W. R. (2012). Auction mechanisms for Force management. In 
J. E. Parco & D. A. Levy, Attitudes aren't free: Thinking deeply about diversity in 
the U.S. Armed Forces (pp. 505-540). Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press. 
Coughlan, P. J., Gates, W. R., & Myung, N. (2013, October). The combinatorial 
retention auction mechanism (CRAM) (Technical Report). Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
Department of Defense Authorization Act 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-342, 94 Stat. 1077, 1095-
1096. (1980). Retrieved 2014, January 15, from 
http://uscodebeta.house.gov/statutes/1980/1980-096-0342.pdf  
Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-94, §904(a)(1) and (2), 
97 Stat. 614, 635–36. (1983). 
Filip, W. N. (2006). Improving the Navy's officer bonus program effectiveness (Master's 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School). Retrieved from 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/handle/10945/2749 
Hansen, M. L., & Moskowitz, M. J. (2006). The effect of compensation on aviator 
retention. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis. Retrieved 2014, April 20, 
from http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/d0014925.a2.pdf 
Homb, H. H. (2006). Salary auctions and matching asincentives for recruiting to 
positions that are hard to fill in the norwegian armed forces (Master's thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School). Retrieved from 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/handle/10945/2880 
 
H. R. Doc No. 113-60 (2013). Retrieved January 23,2014 from: 
 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-113hdoc60/content-detail.html 
 136 
Krishna, V. (2009). Auction theory (2nd ed). New York: Academic Press. 
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1987). Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 699-738. 
Minimum Service Requirement for Certain Flight Crew Positions, 10 U.S.C.§653. 
(2014). Retrieved 2014, February 18, from 
http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-
section653&num=0&edition=prelim 
Myung, N. (2013). Quality adjusted uniform price auction (QUAD). Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School. Mimeo. 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-
180, §622, 101 Stat. 1019, 1100-1101. (1987). 
National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-456, §611, 102 
Stat. 1918, 1977-1979. (1988). 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85 §613, 111 
Stat. 1629, 1786-1788. (1997). 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65 §613, 113 
Stat. 512, 651. (1999). 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No.107-107 §614, 115 
Stat. 1136. (2001). 
Naval Aviation Schools Command. (2013, November 19). Aviation preflight 
indoctrination (API) welcome aboard packet. Pensacola, FL: U. S. Navy. 
Retrieved 2014, March 19, from http://www.netc.navy.mil/nascweb/api/api.htm 
Naval Personnel Command. (n.d.a). Active duty officer promotions: Active duty O3 line. 
Retrieved 2014, April 09, from Naval Personnel Command: 
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/boards/activedutyofficer/03line/Pages/default.aspx 
Naval Personnel Command. (n.d.b). FY-15 Active-duty line community brief (PowerPoint 





Naval Personnel Command. (2012, October 14). FY-14 Administrative selection board 
precept (Memorandum). 
 137 
Naval Personnel Comand. (2013). Order convening the FY-14 aviation department head 
selection board (Memorandum). Millington, TN: Department of the Navy. 
Retrieved 2014, February 12, from http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/boards/screenboards/aviation/Documents/FY14%20ADHSB%20SELECTS.P
DF 
Naval Personnel Command. (2013, May). Aviation screen boards (PowerPoint 
Presentation). Retrieved 2014, April 9, from Naval Personnel Command: 
http://www.public.navy.mil/BUPERS-
NPC/BOARDS/SCREENBOARDS/AVIATION/Pages/default2.aspx 
Naval Personnel Command. (2013, July). Helicopter detailer brief (PowerPoint 
Presentation). Retrieved 2014, March 18, from Naval Personnel Command: 
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/officer/Detailing/aviation/detailers/Pages/Helicopter.aspx 
Naval Personnel Command. (2014, February 3). FY-13 ACCP program information. 
Milington, TN: Department of the Navy. Retrieved 2014, January 12, from 
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/officer/Detailing/aviation/OCM/Pages/ACCP.aspx 
Naval Personnel Command. (2014, February 26). Order convening the FY-15 active 
aviation command screen board (Memorandum). Millingtion, TN: Department of 
the Navy. Retrieved 2014, March 20, from http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/boards/screenboards/aviation/Documents/ACSB_fy15_ActiveCO.pdf  
Navy Appropriations Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 62-433. 37 Stat. 891, 892. (1913). 
Nowell, J. T. (2012). Application of a uniform price quality adusted discount auction for 
assigning surface warfare officer retention bonuses (Master's thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School). Retrieved from 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/handle/10945/6846 
Secretary of the Navy. (2006, January 30). SECNAV instruction 1920.7B: Continuation 
of active duty regular commissioned and reserve officers on the reserve active 
status list (RASL) in the Navy and Marine Corps (Navy Instruction). Washington, 
DC: Department of Defense. Retrieved 2014, April 9, from 
http://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/01000%20Military%20Personnel%20Support/
01-900%20Military%20Separation%20Services/1920.7B.pdf 
Secretary of the Navy. (2013, March 29). Order convening the FY-14 promotion 
selection boards to consider offices in the line on the active-duty list of the Navy 
for permanent promotion to the grade of Lieutenant Commander (Navy 
Memorandum). Washington, DC: Department of Defebse. Retrieved 2014, 




Secretary of the Navy. (2014, February 3). Order convening the FY-15 promotion 
selection boards to consider officers in the line on the active-duty list of the Navy 
for permanent promotion to the grade of Commander (Navy Memorandum). 




Secretary of the Navy. (2014, March). Department of the navy fiscal year (FY) 2015 
budget estimates: Justification of estimates: Military personnel, navy. 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense. Retrieved 2014, May 18, from 
http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/15pres/MPN_BOOK.pdf 
Special Pay: Aviation Career Officers Extending Period of Active Duty, 37 U.S.C.§301b. 
(2014). Retrieved 2014, February 18, from 
http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title37-
section301b&num=0&edition=prelim 
Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. (2008). Tenth quadrennial 
review of military compensation (DOD Report). Washington, DC: DOD. 
Retrieved June 1, 2014, from 
http://prhome.defense.gov/RFM/MPP/docs/Tenth_QRMC_Feb2008_Vol%20II.p
df 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. (2011, November). Military 
compensation background papers: Compensation elements and related manpower 
cost items, their purposes and legislative backgrounds (DOD Report). 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense. Retrieved 2013, January 6, from 
http://militarypay.defense.gov/Docs/MC_All-Combined.pdf  
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness. (2012, June). Report of the 
eleventh quadrennial review of military compensation (DOD Report). Retrieved 
June 3, 2014, from Military Compensation: 
http://militarypay.defense.gov/reports/qrmc/11th_QRMC_Main_Report_(290pp)_
Linked.pdf 
Uniformed Services Pay Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-60, §113, 95 Stat. 989,985. (1980). 
U.S. Navy. (n.d.). Air squadrons. Retrieved 2014, June 2, from U.S. Navy (public 
website): http://www.public.navy.mil/Pages/AirSquadrons.aspx 
Verenna, T. K. (2007). Auction theory and its potential use in the army aviation bonus 
system (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School). Retrieved from 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/handle/10945/3034 
White, C.S. (2010). The uniform price quality adusted discount auction for aviation 
continuation pay: Potential benefits to the U.S. marine corps (Master's thesis, 
139 
Naval Postgraduate School). Retrieved from 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/handle/10945/5412 
 140 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 141 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
 
